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Profiting From Our Pain: Privileged
Access to Social Impact Investing
Cary Martin Shelby*
Social impacting investing has become the latest trend to
permeate the financial markets. With massive anticipated funding gaps
for sustainable development goals, and a millennial-driven thirst for
doing good while doing well, this trend is likely to continue in the
coming decades. This burgeoning industry is poised to experience yet
an additional boost, since it provides an alternative mechanism for
private actors to “profit from our pain,” particularly in the wake of
the COVID-19 pandemic and the Black Lives Matter movement.
As to be expected, the law has not sufficiently adapted to this new
wave of innovation. Scholars have thus focused on how social impact
investing should be measured and disclosed. However, they have paid
limited attention to whether federal securities laws’ antiquated
distinctions between public and private indicators—or rather its
public-private divide—contributes to the harms that poorly overseen
social impact investments can cause. This Article seeks to fill this
scholarly gap by exploring how this public-private divide gives rise to
the possibility that social impact investing will lead to exploitation.
This divide permits regulatory loopholes where social impact investors
can obscure information about potential negative externalities flowing
from their investments. It further allows elite investors to exclusively
profit from community pain.
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These loopholes are troubling because social impact investing
has the highest potential for impact along the continuum of socially
conscious strategies. However, due to the need for regulatory
flexibilities, such as the power to invest in illiquid assets, most social
impact investors operate as exempt entities. Retail investors, who
encompass all members of the general public, are restricted from
accessing these privately held investment vehicles due to investor
protection concerns. Restricting investors in this manner is a primary
indicator of privateness under federal securities laws. Affected
community members, who are the targeted beneficiaries of these
schemes, are thus excluded as investors. This exclusion also limits
transparency, yet an additional indicator of privateness, which would
enable the general public as well as policy makers to make
assessments about the extent to which these schemes are maximizing
net social welfare. This is particularly problematic given the potential
for social impact investments to generate unaccounted for negative
externalities, such as when seemingly clean energy technologies
inadvertently destroy surrounding environments or habitats. Solely
relying on privately ordered solutions can leave costly loopholes given
that they are completely voluntary and lack standardization.
Innovative regulatory solutions that reconceptualize this publicprivate divide may best address potential harms of social impact
investments. This Article proposes to combine existing indicators of
“publicness” and “privateness” while perhaps creating new
measures. Codified in an entirely new series of exemptions entitled the
“Social Impact Exemptions” that would appear under the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Investment Company Act of 1940, these
exemptions would effectively recalibrate existing rules related to retail
investor access and disclosure, while possibly creating new
frameworks for accountability and management structure.
Introduction........................................................................................... 1263
I. Assessing the Landscape: Restricted Access to Impact .................... 1272
A. Core Characteristics ........................................................... 1273
1. Impact is Broadly Defined and Flexible to Adviser and
Investor Goals with Limited Constraints ..................... 1273
2. The Degree of Anticipated Return on Investment Varies
Across Social Impact Investing Strategies .................. 1274
3. Measuring Impact ........................................................ 1276
B. Social Impact Investing Has the Highest Potential for Impact
Amongst Socially Conscious Strategies ............................ 1278
C. Federal Securities Law Excludes Targeted Communities from
Social Impact Investing Opportunities .............................. 1282
II. The Problem: Privileged Access Produces Unintended Harms ....... 1285
A. Limited Net Social Benefit Analysis in the Private Sector 1286

2021]

PROFITING FROM OUR PAIN

1263

B. Increased Potential for Negative Externalities .................. 1291
C. Resulting Opaqueness Under Federal Securities Laws
Reduces Opportunities for Accountability ........................ 1297
D. Limitations of Private Ordering ......................................... 1300
III. Reconceptualizing the Public-Private Divide Through New Social
Impact Exemptions .................................................................... 1303
A. Social Impact Exemptions ................................................. 1304
1. Disclosure .................................................................... 1306
2. Access .......................................................................... 1307
3. Accountability ............................................................. 1310
4. Management ................................................................ 1312
Conclusion ............................................................................................ 1314

INTRODUCTION
Profiting from our pain is not a new phenomenon. The commodification of
marginalization has taken many forms due to the increasing reliance on private
investment as a response to an assortment of injustices.1 Proponents of this
approach have argued that it helps to eradicate bureaucratic inefficiencies and
budgetary constraints connected to government oversight.2 Even with these
proffered benefits, this approach regularly leads to deleterious harms for its
targeted communities. These harms often result from the limited oversight and
accountability mechanisms within the laws that govern these transactions, which
enable private actors to create and obscure such harms for a profit.
The plentiful examples of private actors profiting from our pain, while
creating even more pain, are deeply troubling. Gentrification has led to an
insidious history of forcibly displacing communities of color that have long
suffered from poverty and discrimination, for the sake of creating highly

1. See Etienne C. Toussaint, Dismantling the Master’s House: Toward a Justice-Based Theory
of Community Economic Development, 53 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 337, 341 (2019) (“Yet, legal scholars
have long noted the intersectionality of both approaches; arguing, for example, that the social justice
mission of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s— in many ways carried on by today’s
movement for [B]lack lives—is inextricably linked to the economic justice of marginalized
communities.”); Nancy Koehn, The Time Is Right for Creative Capitalism, HARV. BUS. SCH. WORKING
KNOWLEDGE (Aug. 20, 2008), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/the-time-is-right-for-creative-capitalism
[https://perma.cc/LH4K-NVV4] (“According to [Bill] Gates, creative capitalism is ‘an approach where
governments, businesses, and nonprofits work together to stretch the reach of market forces so that more
people can make a profit, or gain recognition, doing work that eases the world’s inequities.’”).
2. John B. Goodman & Gary W. Loveman, Does Privatization Serve the Public Interest?,
HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1991, at 26, 26 (“According to privatization’s supporters, this shift from
public to private management is so profound that it will produce a panoply of significant improvements:
boosting the efficiency and quality of remaining government activities, reducing taxes, and shrinking
the size of government. In the functions that are privatized, they argue, the profit-seeking behavior of
new, private sector managers will undoubtedly lead to cost cutting and greater attention to customer
satisfaction.”).
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lucrative development opportunities for wealthy or institutional stakeholders.3
Similarly, the privatization of social services such as foster care, prisons, and
even Medicaid has led to devastating harms that are difficult to fully quantify.4
With respect to foster care in particular, one investigation revealed “that children
in the care of private companies, such as the MENTOR Network, based in
Massachusetts and operating in approximately 26 states, are plagued by shortcuts
taken by these companies to increase profit.”5 These shortcuts all served to inflict
additional layers of abuse and trauma for this already vulnerable population.6
Vulture funds, where wealthy and institutional investors purchase the debt of
distressed economies at discounted prices, often implement stringent austerity
measures to ensure repayment.7 These austerity measures can cause great harm
to affected communities in the form of reduced funding for public education,

3. Emily Chong, Examining the Negative Impacts of Gentrification, GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
BLOG (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/poverty-journal/blog/examining-thenegative-impacts-of-gentrification/ [https://perma.cc/7S75-QEEH] (summarizing the ill-effects of
gentrification such as the displacement of entire communities, “through exponentially increasing
property prices, coercion, or buyouts”).
4. See, e.g., Aram Roston & Jeremy Singer-Vine, Senate Finds 86 Children Died in Care of
Giant For-Profit Foster Care Firm, Citing BuzzFeed News, BUZZFEED (Oct. 18, 2017),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/aramroston/senate-finds-86-children-died-in-care-of-giant-forprofit [https://perma.cc/LFQ6-X8JJ]; Toussaint, supra note 1, at 395 (“[O]ur current prison industrial
complex is in fact a new system of social control designed to subjugate marginalized black communities,
not merely a manifestation of wayward urban residents in need of ‘tough love.’”); IN THE PUB. INT.,
HOW PRIVATIZATION INCREASES INEQUALITY 31 (2016), https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wpcontent/uploads/InthePublicInterest_InequalityReport_Sept2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/65UK-B2FN]
(“Instead of administering the [Medicaid] program themselves, some states have contracted with private
managed-care organizations (MCOs), which are typically private insurance companies, and pay a set
amount per member per month to the MCOs based on the projected cost of services that Medicaid
recipients will require that year.”).
5. Jessalyn Schwartz, Youth in Privatized Foster Care: What You as an Advocate Need to
Know, ABA (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrensrights/practice/2017/youth-privatized-foster-care-what-you-as-advocate-need-to-know/
[https://perma.cc/F2QJ-5T4A].
6. See id. This population is frequently exploited for private gain. For instance, a family of five
orphaned children was infamously exploited by a former reality show called Extreme Makeover, where
a family was rewarded with a brand-new mansion as contestants of this show, after agreeing to care for
these five children whose parents had tragically died. See Higgins v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty.,
45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293, 296–99 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). However, within weeks of Extreme Makeover
constructing this mansion and airing its accompanying episode, the host family removed the orphaned
children from their new mansion. Id. They were able to keep the mansion despite no longer caring for
the children, while Extreme Makeover earned millions of dollars in advertising revenue from airing (and
re-airing) this particular episode. Id. The orphaned children received little to no recourse due to the
unconscionable contract that they had unknowingly signed. Id. at 302–06.
7. See, e.g., Tom Hals, Detroit Draws Attention from Hedge Fund Investors Looking to Profit
Off
City’s
Debt,
Possible
Bankruptcy,
REUTERS
(July
8,
2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/08/detroit-investors-hedge-funds-bankruptcydebt_n_3234577.html [https://perma.cc/E8M2-CJDL]; Matt Wirz, Big Hedge Funds Roll Dice on
Puerto
Rico
Debt,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Apr.
9,
2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303873604579491992862363698
[https://perma.cc/C9VR-EKFD].
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medical care, public pension payments, and other government-funded services.8
Yet the law that regulates these funds has categorized them as exempt entities,
making it exceedingly difficult to assess the full magnitude of these harms.9
The focal point of this Article, social impact investing, raises additional
possibilities for elite investors to exploit disadvantaged groups. Definitionally,
social impact investments seek to positively impact the environment or society
at large, while simultaneously yielding a return for underlying investors.10 For
example, social impact investors are increasingly allocating to companies that
produce innovations related to improving educational outcomes for K-12
students.11 They often seek to provide nontraditional schooling options or
emerging technologies that improve students’ learning experiences.12 However,
privately developed solutions that receive limited community input can generate
negative externalities in the form of increased inequalities and ineffective
learning outcomes.13 As one source noted, “an edtech company that is only
selling to more affluent suburban schools, for example, is only exacerbating a
gap between wealthy and poor students rather than closing it.”14 Students who
8. See Patrick Gillespie, Hedge Funds Want Puerto Rico to Close Schools, CNN BUS. (Aug.
4, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/04/investing/puerto-rico-hedge-funds-close-schools/
[https://perma.cc/28RK-J738]; see also Kate Aronoff, Hedge Fund-Driven Austerity Could Come Back
to Bite the Hedge Funds Driving it in Puerto Rico, INTERCEPT (Feb. 3, 2018),
https://theintercept.com/2018/02/03/puerto-rico-debt-fiscal-plan [https://perma.cc/99T3-F9DY].
9. With respect to contract law jurisprudence, many would argue that it has enabled superior
bargaining power with respect to contractual relationships, which has led to a similar phenomenon where
wealthy counterparties can exploit the hardships of disadvantaged communities for their economic gain.
See, e.g., Higgins, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296–99; Schwartz, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
10. See Sarah Dadush, Regulating Social Finance: Can Social Stock Exchanges Meet the
Challenge, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 139, 143 (2015) (“With social finance, impact investors put their capital
behind ventures (known as ‘social businesses’) that profitably cater to underserved populations. These
businesses provide access to critical goods and services, such as financial services, healthcare, affordable
housing and quality employment to the economically and socially disadvantaged—people excluded
from ordinary markets because conventional businesses view them as being too costly or risky to service
or employ.”); see also infra Part II.A (deconstructing core characteristics of social impact investment
schemes).
11. ASHWIN ASSOMULL, SUDEEP LAAD & AAKASH BUDHIRAJA, L.E.K. CONSULTING, IMPACT
INVESTING IN EDUCATION: THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE, (2020),
https://www.lek.com/sites/default/files/PDFs/Impact-Investing-Education-Final_v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PMQ-XLD7].
12. See, e.g., Alex Konrad, Why the VCs at Reach Capital Are Doubling Down on Education
with
a
New
$82
Million
Fund,
FORBES
(July
30,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2018/07/30/reach-capital-82-millionfund/?sh=6b6e66c54b38 [https://perma.cc/23K3-DTRC] (“Reach will look to invest in startups
working in areas such as student debt repayment and nontraditional schooling on top of its K-12 roots.”).
13. See, e.g., Andrew Jack, Lack of Clear Targets Hinders Impact Investing in Education, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4f9ad318-786d-11e8-af48-190d103e32a4
[https://perma.cc/P26K-VMV7] (“[S]uch investments risk exacerbating inequalities, cherry-picking the
best students and teachers while undermining government provision and leaving the poorest further
behind.”).
14. Mary Ann Azevedo, Growth with an Impact: The Rise of VCs Looking to Fund a
(Profitable) Cause, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Feb. 2, 2018), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/growthimpact-rise-vcs-looking-fund-profitable-cause [https://perma.cc/VQ7D-AT82].
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live in distressed communities may be experiencing interconnected needs related
to food, shelter, safety, and other necessities—needs which may be poorly
understood by outsiders.15
Similarly, some sources have found that social impact investors may further
increase allocations to charter schools and other private schooling options
despite the unresolved debates as to whether these options cause harm to
communities that already experience poor access to education.16 One such study
found that “[c]ost-cutting charters . . . offer a narrow curriculum focused on little
more than reading and math test prep, inexperienced teachers with high turnover,
and ‘blended learning’ products designed to enrich charter school board
members’ investment portfolios.”17 Irrespective of this ongoing debate,
unaccounted for harms can increase the collective “pain” experienced by
communities with already limited economic resources while disincentivizing
investment in public education.
Social impact investing can admittedly provide innovative solutions to
funding gaps, such as eradicating poverty, reversing climate change, reducing
inequality, and other United Nations’ global sustainable development goals.18
However, this Article argues that the federal securities laws’ public-private
divide creates exploitation opportunities with respect to social impact
15. See Jill Barshay, Impact Funds Pour Money into Ed Tech Businesses, HECHINGER REP.
(Oct. 21, 2019), https://hechingerreport.org/impact-funds-pour-money-into-ed-tech-businesses
[https://perma.cc/L4KR-RK5E] (“The problem is that there isn’t strong research evidence for the
effectiveness of a lot of ed tech. . . . I worry that impact funds will help well-intentioned companies build
effective marketing teams to sell ineffective products to schools.”).
16. See, e.g., Mark Medema, Opinion, Charter Schools Are an Opportunity for Impact
Investors, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/charter-schools-are-anopportunity-for-impact-investors-11572209068 [https://perma.cc/K3QQ-FY9J] (arguing that charter
schools are an “ideal opportunity for impact investing” that can also achieve “better education for
America’s children”).
17. Valerie Strauss, A Dozen Problems with Charter Schools, WASH. POST (May 20, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/05/20/a-dozen-problems-with-charterschools [https://perma.cc/83GE-YK2R].
18. The United Nations has predicted “a need for $3.9 trillion a year between now and 2030 to
meet the Sustainable Development Goals. Philanthropy and government funding is not enough to meet
this need and will require an additional $2.5 trillion a year to fill the gap.” What Is Impact Investing and
Why
Should
You
Care?,
BRIDGESPAN
GRP.
(Dec.
6,
2018),
https://www.bridgespan.org/insights/library/impact-investing/what-is-impact-investing
[https://perma.cc/62QY-ZJZD]; RICHARD KOGAN & KATHLEEN BRYANT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, PROGRAM SPENDING OUTSIDE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE HISTORICALLY LOW
AS
A
PERCENT OF GDP AND PROJECTED TO FALL FURTHER 1 (2019),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-29-12bud.pdf [https://perma.cc/GW69-F3LZ]
(summarizing the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities’ predictions that “[t]otal spending on federal
programs outside Social Security and Medicare will equal 11.1 percent of GDP in 2019 — below the
40-year average of 11.9 percent — and is projected to decline further over the next ten years, to 9.7
percent of GDP in 2029”); see Sustainable Development Goals, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/ [https://perma.cc/B5T8UZYG] (“The Sustainable Development Goals are the blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable
future for all. They address the global challenges we face, including those related to poverty, inequality,
climate change, environmental degradation, peace and justice.”).
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investments. Publicness in this context implies heightened degrees of access and
transparency for entities and offerings regulated by federal securities laws.
Privateness entails exemptions from the arduous transparency requirements of
these laws due to exclusive access by elite investors. Since social impact
investors largely operate as exempt entities, this public-private divide allows
elite investors to exclusively profit from community pain while obscuring
information about potential negative externalities flowing from these
investments.
Neither the public-private divide in securities law nor regulatory issues
surrounding social impact investing are new to scholarly discourse, but limited
attention has been paid to their interaction. Scholars have previously examined
federal securities laws’ incoherent notions of publicness in other contexts.19
Researchers have further identified regulatory issues within the impact investing
space, such as the extent to which impact should be measured and the optimal
legal entity for effectuating social impact strategies.20 Nevertheless, this Article

19. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 339–40 (2013) (analyzing evolving
assessment of publicness under the JOBS Act of 2012); see also Robert B. Thompson & Donald C.
Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1578–88 (2013); A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited:
Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999, 1001
(2013) (arguing “that the resulting mismatch between the public-private dividing lines under [the
Securities and Exchange Acts] means that the transition from private to public will inevitably be
awkward, abrupt, and fraught with problems for issuers, investors, and regulators”); Onnig H.
Dombalagian, Principles for Publicness, 67 FLA. L. REV. 649, 653 (2016) (proposing “reframing” a
disclosure and compliance regime for public companies “around three well-worn regulatory principles:
(1) suitability, (2) efficiency, and (3) representativeness”); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding
and the Public/Private Divide in U.S. Securities Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 477 (2014)
(examining how recent crowd-funding legislation affects the public/private divide under federal
securities laws); Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the
Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 445 (2017) (highlighting how “the new public-private divide
[is] centered on its information effects . . . [though] private companies are thriving in part by freeriding
on the information contained in public company stock prices and disclosure”). Others have examined
the eroding public-private divide resulting from events surrounding the financial crises of 2007–2009,
which was uniquely characterized by costly spillover effects from the interconnected failure of notable
financial institutions. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 137, 137 (2011) (positing that “the failure of the fiduciaries of public corporations to understand
their ‘publicness’ . . . accounts for many of the recent scandals”). Previous works by the author have
examined the incoherency of publicness resulting from the patchwork of regulation historically imposed
upon the investment fund industry, as well as the blurred line between private investment funds and
publicly traded investment banks resulting from shadow banking, systemic risk, and widening
regulatory loopholes. See generally Cary Martin Shelby, Are Hedge Funds Still Private? Exploring
Publicness in the Face of Incoherency, 69 SMU L. REV. 405 (2016); Cary Martin Shelby, Closing the
Hedge Fund Loophole: The SEC as the Primary Regulator of Systemic Risk, 58 B.C. L. REV. 639 (2017).
20. See, e.g., IVY SO & ALINA STASKEVICIUS, MEASURING THE “IMPACT” IN IMPACT
INVESTING 11–57 (2015), https://www.hbs.edu/socialenterprise/documents/measuringimpact.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D2GL-UWRA] (recognizing the predominant focus on exploring the ways in which
impact is measured, while specifically studying the practices and methodologies that a subset of impact
investors is utilizing in measuring both social and financial impact); HAUKE HILLEBRANDT & JOHN
HALSTEAD,
FOUNDERS
PLEDGE,
IMPACT
INVESTING
REPORT
(2018),
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is the first to examine harms resulting from the federal securities laws’ publicprivate divide in the context of the burgeoning social impact investing industry.
Laws that regulate the investment fund industry have effectively created an
inverse relationship between impact potential and access to affected community
members. Social impact investing has the highest potential for impact along the
continuum of socially conscious strategies due to its primary objective of
generating positive social or environmental impacts. However, most social
impact investors operate as privately held entities, which are exempt from federal
securities laws. These exemptions have a rational basis: often social impact
investing requires long-term commitments, and accordingly requires additional
regulatory flexibilities such as the power to invest in illiquid assets.21 Yet, retail
investors, who encompass all members of the general public, are restricted from
accessing private offerings due to investor protection concerns that are rooted in
the paternalistic nature of our federal securities laws.22
As a result, average investors are generally limited to mutual funds and
other registered investment funds that trade in baskets of publicly traded equities,
bonds, and cash instruments—which do pursue socially conscious strategies but
have limited impact.23 Mutual funds and exchange-traded funds have
increasingly prioritized socially conscious strategies such as socially responsible
investing (“SRI”) and integrating environment, social, and governance factors
(“ESG”) in assessing allocations. Funds that implement ESG practices consider
“the environmental, social, and governance practices of an investment that may

https://founderspledge.com/research/fp-impact-investing [https://perma.cc/K4DT-BF7E] (evaluating
whether social impact investing produces a greater impact than simply donating to charity through
philanthropic efforts); Deborah Burand & Anne Tucker, Legal Literature Review of Social
Entrepreneurship and Impact Investing (2007–2017): Doing Good by Doing Business, 11 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 29 (2019) (positing that many scholars researching within the social enterprise
field have heavily focused on choice of legal entity such as benefit corporations and L3Cs); Graeme
Kerr, Investors Warn over Impact Fund ‘Greenwashing,’ PRIV. EQUITY INT’L (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://www.privateequityinternational.com/investors-warn-impact-fund-greenwashing/
[https://perma.cc/2PR5-QY66] (advising that pension plans and other institutional investors engage in
heightened due diligence procedures to protect against “greenwashing,” where impact funds magnify or
falsify the extent to which they are generating positive societal impacts); Magali A. Delmas & Vanessa
Cuerel Burbano, The Drivers of Greenwashing, 54 CAL. MGMT. REV. 64, 65 (2011) (developing “a
framework that examines the institutional, organizational, and individual drivers of greenwashing [to]
then use this framework to develop recommendations for how to decrease firm greenwashing”); Etienne
C. Toussaint, The New Gospel of Wealth: On Social Impact Bonds and the Privatization of Public Good,
56 HOUS. L. REV. 153 (2018) (examining the limitations of the social impact bond framework in that its
design is rooted in neoliberal principles that serve to disregard the integral role of government in
promoting the public interest).
21. See infra Parts II.B & C (providing an in-depth explanation as to how social impact investing
is distinguishable from other socially conscious strategies, as well as why it requires a range of
investment flexibilities under federal securities laws).
22. See infra Part II.C (summarizing applicable exemptions under federal securities laws which
serve to exclude retail investors from a large number of social impact investing schemes).
23. See infra Part II.C.
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have a material impact on the performance of that investment.”24 However,
trading in publicly traded instruments likely produces lower levels of impact,
since socially neutral investors tend to seize the opportunity to purchase
undervalued securities resulting from SRI and ESG activities.25 If such
companies are already generating a return, investors will likely flock to these
opportunities irrespective of whether they are employing a socially conscious
strategy.26
Similar access and disclosure problems can admittedly occur within
vehicles that are registered under federal securities laws, since affected
community members may encounter hurdles in accessing mutual funds (and
other registered structures) for reasons that are unrelated to the public-private
divide.27 However, a limited number of affected community members meet the
wealth or income thresholds to qualify as investors in exempt social impact
vehicles. Dictating who can profit from the commodification of community pain
in this manner can also contribute to wealth inequality. Moreover, due to a range
of issues related to a pervasive lack of diversity in this industry, targeted
community members are even less likely to serve as managers of exempt
vehicles than of registered vehicles. While the disclosure obligations of
registered mutual funds are limited in terms of protecting outside stakeholder
community interests, there is at least some accountability provided through their
arduous registration requirements.28 By contrast, exempt entities are empowered
to significantly restrict disclosures to their underlying investors as well as to the
general public.
This increased opacity amplifies the extent to which social impact investors
can harm the very communities that they are intending to help. While the
privatization of public functions has historically led to several unaccounted for
costs, the federal securities laws’ public-private divide exacerbates these harms
because exempt vehicles face even lower accountability measures. This limited

24. Michelle Zhou, ESG, SRI, and Impact Investing: What’s the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA
(Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/financial-advisor/esg-sri-impact-investing-explainingdifference-clients [https://perma.cc/QHW3-6HTK]; see also DOUGLAS M. GRIM & DANIEL B.
BERKOWITZ,VANGUARD, ESG, SRI, AND IMPACT INVESTING: A PRIMER FOR DECISION-MAKING 7–8
(2018), https://personal.vanguard.com/pdf/ISGESG.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZY2-9FDK].
25. See infra Part I.B.
26. See infra Part I.B.
27. Affected community members may not have access to mutual funds via retirement accounts
due to a number of issues related to chronic poverty, pervasive inequities, and several other social ills.
28. On May 21, 2020, the SEC Advisory Committee recommended a range of improvements
related to ESG disclosures of publicly traded companies, which included a recommendation to “provide
Issuers with a framework to disclose material, decision-useful, comparable, and consistent information
in respect of their own businesses, rather than the current situation where investors largely rely on third
party ESG data providers, which may not always be reliable, consistent, or necessarily material.” See
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N INV. ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATION OF THE SEC INVESTOR
ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
RELATING
TO
ESG
DISCLOSURE
1
(2020),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/esg-disclosure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QU7Z-6AUV].
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transparency can potentially lead to an increase in negative externalities
generated by social impact funds as well as their underlying operating
companies, signaling market failures that warrant regulatory intervention. As
further described in Part II.B of this Article, categories of such negative
externalities can include: (1) seemingly clean energy investments inadvertently
destroying a surrounding environment or habitat; (2) the crowding out of higher
quality products or services that produce a greater level of impact; and (3) the
wholesale displacement of targeted communities.29
Negative externalities are even more likely to occur given the projected
growth of the social impact investment industry. Some have estimated that it
nearly doubled in size between 2017 and 2018 as it currently accounts for
approximately $228 billion in assets under management.30 Commentators have
found that millennial investors have largely driven this growth as they tend to
favor investments that are tied to a social benefit.31 According to Mark Haefele,
global chief investment officer for the wealth management division at UBS,
“[millennials] are extremely interested in sustainable investing, and 85 per cent
of millennials are very interested in impact investing.”32 This industry, along
with other socially conscious strategies, will probably experience even more
growth given potential innovations arising in response to the many layers of the
COVID-19 pandemic.33 The pandemic also increased the extent to which already
vulnerable communities are marginalized, making them even more attractive
targets for social impact investors while further widening the gap between the
wealthy and the poor.
The racial injustices unveiled by the Black Lives Matter movement will
provide comparable opportunities for the private sphere to develop profitable
responses, perhaps to the exclusion and detriment of the Black community that

29. See infra Part II.B (providing a detailed analysis of the negative externalities that have been
generated by social impact investments).
30. JP Dallmann, Impact Investing, Just a Trend or the Best Strategy to Help Save Our World?,
FORBES (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jpdallmann/2018/12/31/impact-investing-justa-trend-or-the-best-strategy-to-help-save-our-world/ [https://perma.cc/RP69-HKVN].
31. See Owen Walker, Impact Investors Shoot for Clearer Goals, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/fc7964f2-7474-11e8-bab2-43bd4ae655dd [https://perma.cc/CY28-FZ9S].
32. Id.
33. See Alan Farley, The Blackstone Group Could Profit from the Pandemic, INVESTOPEDIA
(Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/the-blackstone-group-could-benefit-from-thepandemic-4799689 [https://perma.cc/9WSB-5SW9] (predicting that “the Blackstone Group Inc. (BX)
is likely to profit from the coronavirus pandemic in coming years, reopening the 2009 and 2010
playbook when the company stepped in and bought thousands of foreclosed properties”); Nigam Arora,
Opinion: The U.S. Stock Market May Enjoy the Biggest Rally Ever When the Pandemic Is Over,
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/its-time-for-scenario-analysisheres-how-the-stock-market-could-boom-this-year-2020-04-15
[https://perma.cc/5JZ4-C7BB];
Caroline Lupini, 4 Companies Selling Masks and Helping Our Communities, FORBES (May 1, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/advisor/2020/05/01/4-companies-selling-masks-and-helping-ourcommunities/ [https://perma.cc/2KNP-X756].
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the movement was intended to help.34 For example, social impact investors may
allocate to private entities that offer policing alternatives and are designed to be
more responsive to community needs.35 Private investors may flock to these
alternatives given their potential to promote racial justice initiatives. Yet, these
entities may be composed entirely of White, elite investors with no community
oversight, crowding out actual community restorative justice groups or leading
to disinvestment in public infrastructure and programming. Without the reforms
posited in this Article, there is limited oversight to ensure that such initiatives
actually serve to improve the lives of the community they proffer to serve.
Involving affected community members as investors or managers could
mitigate many of these harms as their interests would be more closely aligned
with the underlying projects of targeted social impact investments. Community
members have an enhanced understanding of the nuanced issues affecting their
surrounding environments, particularly regarding the interconnectedness of
community needs. This understanding is essential to preventing negative
externalities from occurring ex ante. Attempting to resolve one need without
sufficiently understanding how it could deepen others or create new ones can
cause irreparable damage that cripples entire populations. Enhanced disclosures
would allow affected community members and policy makers to examine the
extent to which social impact investors are measuring net social welfare, and
whether they are conducting appropriate due diligence with regards to the
impacts on surrounding communities.
Solely relying on privately ordered solutions may leave costly loopholes,
which may continuously harm the unsuspecting general public. Moreover,
evidence has emerged that these solutions do little to involve the targeted
beneficiaries of these projects or to provide enhanced accountability mechanisms
for affected community members.36 Despite well-documented harms,
proponents of private ordering would likely support the further development and
growth of social impact investing with limited government intervention.37 Such
privately ordered solutions have recently emerged, and likely will continue to
34. See Meg Massey, What Next? Black Business Leaders Share Thoughts on America in Wake
of Floyd Death, KARMA (June 8, 2020), https://karmaimpact.com/what-next-black-business-leadersshare-thoughts-on-america-in-wake-of-floyd-death/ [https://perma.cc/7UX2-CAPC]; Tim Nash, This
Investment Fund’s Racial Principles Have Paid Off So Far, THE STAR (June 15, 2020),
https://www.thestar.com/business/opinion/2020/06/15/this-investment-funds-racial-principles-havepaid-off-so-far.html [https://perma.cc/RNE6-BA2W].
35. See, e.g., David Risley, Private Police Coming to a Neighborhood Near You! Why Private
Police May Be an Important Element of Future Law Enforcement, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (July 2015),
https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/private-police-coming-to-a-neighborhood
[https://perma.cc/L566-CF66] (“Many communities have already begun to contract with private security
to supplement local law enforcement. Private sector companies are cheaper and focused more on
customer service. In Oakland, California, several neighborhoods have hired private security to patrol
their neighborhoods in response to rising crime rates and reductions in police staffing.”).
36. See infra Part II.D.
37. See infra Part II.D (highlighting many of the limitations of relying on privately ordered
solutions).
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grow in popularity.38 However, leaving these harms unexposed and unregulated
could likewise disincentive the government or philanthropists from dedicating
the necessary resources to resolve these funding gaps due to the misguided
reliance on the private sector.
The public-private divide under federal securities laws must be
reconceptualized to fully resolve these loopholes. Antiquated indicators of
publicness must be updated under various facets of the federal securities laws to
better reflect the innovations generated by regulated industries. Doing so would
invariably require the creation of new regulatory frameworks.39 This Article
presents one such framework: an entirely new series of exemptions entitled the
“Social Impact Exemptions” that should appear under the Securities Act of 1933
and the Investment Company Act of 1940.40 These would recalibrate existing
rules related to access and disclosure, while creating new frameworks for
accountability and management structure.41
Part I of this Article begins by providing a detailed description of the
landscape in which social impact investing operates. It explains how social
impact investments are defined and measured, while highlighting some of the
difficulties of doing so. It then illuminates how the regulatory flexibility afforded
to these investments results in exclusive access by elite investors. Part II fully
unveils the problem underscored in this Article: the restricted access created by
the public-private divide under federal securities laws leads to a reduction of net
social benefits of these schemes. This Section further explores how many such
investments have generated negative externalities that ripple across communities
and ecosystems. It concludes by challenging the overreliance on privately
ordered solutions that can serve to promote the interests of private investors to
the detriment and exclusion of the general public. Part III proposes a series of
tailored “Social Impact Exemptions” that seeks to reconceptualize notions of
“publicness” and “privateness” to better account for the realities of the expanding
social impact investment industry.
I.
ASSESSING THE LANDSCAPE: RESTRICTED ACCESS TO IMPACT
This Section provides a foundational backdrop for understanding the range
of social impact investing strategies utilized by investment funds. While multiple
definitions of social impact investing exist, the term universally encompasses
investments that seek to create broad categories of positive impact. Examples
38. See INT’L FIN. CORP., INVESTING FOR IMPACT: OPERATING PRINCIPLES FOR IMPACT
MANAGEMENT
2
(2019)
[hereinafter
INVESTING
FOR
IMPACT],
https://www.impactprinciples.org/sites/default/files/201906/Impact%20Investing_Principles_FINAL_4-25-19_footnote%20change_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BEY3-TWQH].
39. See id.
40. See infra Part III.A.
41. See infra Part III.A.
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include investments that aim to reduce poverty, reverse climate change, and
eliminate inequality. Strategies also vary with respect to the degree of returns
sought by advisers and investors. The ways in which impact is measured likewise
differs across such strategies. This Section begins by delving deeper into these
core elements of social impact investing while highlighting some of the
difficulties associated with measuring and creating impact. It then explains how
social impact investing carries the greatest potential for impact among socially
conscious investments. But to generate this impact, advisers must retain
regulatory flexibilities under the federal securities laws to pursue illiquid
investments. This Section concludes by highlighting how the public-private
divide under federal securities laws excludes community members who are the
targeted beneficiaries of these investments.
A. Core Characteristics
1. Impact is Broadly Defined and Flexible to Adviser and Investor Goals
with Limited Constraints
The meaning of “social impact investing” has evolved into a broad concept
encompassing a wide range of initiatives. The Global Impact Investing Network
(“GIIN”) defines social impact investing as “investments made with the intention
to generate positive, measurable social and environmental impact alongside a
financial return.”42 The GIIN further provides that “the growing impact
investment market provides capital to address the world’s most pressing
challenges in sectors such as sustainable agriculture, renewable energy,
conservation, microfinance, and affordable and accessible basic services
including housing, healthcare, and education.”43 Examples of tailored social
goals include allocations to companies that have developed mechanisms for
reducing poverty, increasing access to education, or improving healthcare. In
terms of environmental impact, advisers can target companies that have created
innovative technologies for reducing energy use or increasing the use of recycled
materials in a multitude of products.
Social impact investing “provided a broad, rhetorical umbrella [term] under
which a wide range of investors could huddle. The microfinance investor, the
green-tech venture capitalist, the low-income housing lender: all could now see
their affinity within a broader movement and begin to collaborate to address the
similar challenges they faced.”44 Social impact investing connects these advisers,
no longer distinguishing them by their targeted social benefit.

42. What You Need to Know About Impact Investing, GLOB. IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK
(2021), https://thegiin.org/impact-investing/need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/82UF-NAXP].
43. Id.
44. ANTONY BUGG-LEVINE & JED EMERSON, IMPACT INVESTING: TRANSFORMING HOW WE
MAKE MONEY WHILE MAKING A DIFFERENCE 8 (2011).
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Investment fund advisers thus have great latitude in deciding the specific
social impact allocations for underlying portfolios. However, they are often
constrained by internal processes and procedures through which specific targeted
impacts are selected. For instance, the United Way of the Bay Area (“UWBA”)
adopted a goal to reduce poverty in the San Francisco Bay Area as part of its
mission. They implemented this mission pursuant to the following procedures:
We identified a number of investment themes that would be aligned with
a poverty alleviation mission. Those themes helped identify investable
opportunities, securities, and funds. UWBA research and consensus
identified the social drivers that alleviate poverty, such as job creation,
and corresponding objective criteria were identified. This resulted in the
creation of the ‘Bay Area Employers’ index of companies headquartered
in the San Francisco Bay Area, including many large employers that
generally support the mission of UWBA. We determined a series of
social criteria that would be proxies for identifying companies that could
be classified as being “good employers,” having “good management,”
and behaving as “good environmental stewards” in the Bay Area. We
ranked those criteria and used objective data sources to identify
companies that rated well in these criteria. Using computer-driven
portfolio optimization programs, we developed a portfolio of stocks that
would maximize the aggregate custom ESG score . . . .45
In implementing its mission, UWBA created seemingly objective measures
for alleviating poverty and constructed an index of companies that employed
these measures.
Advisers face additional limitations beyond internal procedural
mechanisms, including investor instructions and fiduciary obligations. Wealthy
and institutional investors, who often possess greater bargaining power in
negotiating for specific restrictions, can also limit advisers by giving specific
instructions regarding social impact opportunities.46 Fiduciary duties may further
constrain the kinds of social impact initiatives pursued by advisers, as fiduciary
law may not view social impact initiatives as consistent with an advisers’
fiduciary duties. Thus, advisers frequently select social impact allocations based
on the extent to which such investments can yield a return.47
2. The Degree of Anticipated Return on Investment Varies Across Social
Impact Investing Strategies
Categorizing impact by desired return is an effective analytical tool. Social
impact investing approaches generally fall within three categories along a
45. Lauryn Agnew & Seal Cove Fin., Impact Investing for Small, Place-Based Fiduciaries: The
Research Study Initiated by the United Way of Bay Area 7 (Ctr. for Cmty. Dev. Invs., Working Paper
No.
2012-05,
2012),
https://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/wp2012-05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QMC8-FZ6D].
46. See infra Part II.A.
47. See infra Part I.A.2.
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continuum of possibilities in yielding a return: (1) strategies that maximize
impact and sacrifice financial returns accordingly; (2) strategies that target a
middle ground, prioritizing impact so long as the financial return approaches
market rate; and (3) strategies that seek to earn at or above market-rate returns.
Social impact investing strategies that sacrifice financial returns for the
sake of maximizing potential impact fall at one end of this spectrum. This
approach has been referred to as “Impact First,”48 or “concessionary,”49 among
other expert classifications. Foregoing a financial return in this manner is
comparable to a philanthropist providing a grant or donation to a particular cause
or non-profit organization. These kinds of allocations fall within the outer range
of possible social impact investing strategies since a common characterization of
social impact investing is making a difference while simultaneously earning a
financial return. While fiduciary duties would likely restrict registered fund
advisers from selecting such allocations, Private Fund advisers have more
leeway to do so due to a web of exemptions under federal securities laws.50
Social impact strategies that yield returns falling slightly below the marketrate lie at the middle of this spectrum.51 These kinds of approaches acknowledge
that sacrifices related to anticipated returns are required for certain categories of
social impact opportunities. Advisers possess greater freedoms to pursue these
kinds of social impact investing strategies since they produce some degree of
yield for their underlying investors. Advisers can further argue that social impact
investing provides diversification benefits for investors while also hedging
against the long-term harms that the social impact investing strategy seeks to
improve. However, advisers still run the risk of violating the “best interests”
duties under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
Social impact investments that seek to earn at or above market-rate returns
fall at the opposite end of the spectrum. Researchers describe allocations of this
nature as “non-concessionary,”52 or “investment first,”53 among other
classifications. These kinds of allocations are more standard since the goal of
most investment strategies is an above-market rate of return for investors. If not,
then investors would fare better by simply allocating their limited capital to riskfree financial instruments without having to pay additional fees to advisers.
Finding these kinds of social impact investing allocations are golden

48.
49.

See Agnew & Seal Cove Fin., supra note 45, at 12.
See Paul Brest & Kelly Born, When Can Impact Investing Create Real Impact?, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV., Fall 2013, at 22, 24.
50. See infra Part II.A.
51. See JACOB GRAY, NICK ASHBURN, HARRY DOUGLAS & JESSICA JEFFERS, WHARTON SOC.
IMPACT INITIATIVE, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: MISSION PRESERVATION AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
IN
IMPACT
INVESTING
17
(2015),
https://socialimpact.wharton.upenn.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/Great-Expectations-Mission-Preservation-and-Financial-Performance-inImpact-Investing.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3Y5-PWBE].
52. See Brest & Born, supra note 49, at 24.
53. See Agnew & Seal Cove Fin., supra note 45, at 12.
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opportunities, as most investors would welcome the prospect of earning abovemarket returns while doing something good for society. Similarly, advisers do
not have to be concerned about violating their fiduciary duties.54 However,
whether social impact opportunities even increase overall social impact can be
difficult to assess.55 Profitable social impact investing opportunities are likely to
continue growing irrespective of whether advisers of social impact investing
strategies specifically seek them out. If an enterprise is profitable, it will
encounter little difficulties in accessing a wide range of investors.
Other categories of social impact enterprises aspire to build the
infrastructure of this burgeoning industry, as opposed to investing directly into
these opportunities. One such example is a “Catalyst First” strategy, which
“includes those who want their investments to act as a catalyst that will bring
other investors into collaborative partnerships or help build the infrastructure of
this emerging [social impact investing] industry.”56 Companies that build rating
systems for social impact investments also fall within this category. For example,
the Boulder Institute created a rating system for micro-finance institutions as
well as training programs to incentivize best practices within this industry.57
Other categories that generally fall into this “Catalyst First” strategy include
helping investors find and promote social impact investments and providing
technical and governance assistance.58 While these companies may not invest
directly into social impact opportunities, they seek to earn returns based on the
services that they provide to social impact market participants.
As this Section has shown, social impact investing strategies vary widely
in their implementation and goals. The degree to which a particular strategy
balances impact and profit influences both the investment’s impact and the
potential external harm created.
3. Measuring Impact
To measure impact, models focus on different aspects of an investment’s
impact.59 Enterprise impact, for example, focuses on the product or operational
impact of an individual company.60 Product impact evaluates the social impact
of an enterprise’s goods and services, while operational impact “is the impact of
the enterprise’s management practices on its employees’ health and economic
54. See infra Part II.A.
55. See infra Part II.C.
56. Agnew & Seal Cove Fin., supra note 45, at 12.
57. See Boulder Institute at a Glance, BOULDER INST. OF MICROFINANCE,
https://www.bouldermicrofinance.org/boulder/EN/BOULDER/glance [https://perma.cc/B9EA-6PEA]
(capturing an overview of the institute’s programs and training methodologies).
58. See Brest & Born, supra note 49, at 26.
59. See Chris Addy, Maya Chorengel, Mariah Collins & Michael Etzel, Calculating the Value
of Impact Investing: An Evidence-Based Way to Estimate Social and Environmental Returns, HARV.
BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2019, at 102 (providing an excellent summary of available measures, as well as a
relatively new one).
60. See Brest & Born, supra note 49, at 24.
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security, its effect on jobs or other aspect of the well-being of the community in
which it operates, or the environmental effects of its supply chain and
operations.”61 Measuring the “outcome” of a particular enterprise looks beyond
product and operational impact to determine the short-term and long-term effects
that the company’s output has on its surrounding environment and people.62
These models are plagued by a pervasive lack of standardization with
respect to how impact is measured and disclosed.63 Impact categories naturally
implicate a range of interconnected factors, which can occur across diverse
geographical and sociological regions, making them exceedingly difficult to
standardize.64
These deficiencies with impact-measuring models have also led to frequent
incidences of “impact washing,” which occurs when “actors . . . [adopt] the label
without meaningful fidelity to impact.”65 Complicated corporate and fund
structures make it easier for social impact investors and their underlying
operating companies to engage in impact washing. For example, a fund or one
of its operating companies (and even a subsidiary of an operating company) may
be investing in “clean” energy alternatives while another within the same family
of entities is investing in fossil fuels—counteracting the positive externalities
generated by the clean energy investments. Given that these entities are typically
treated as “separate” under state corporate governance and federal securities
laws, it may be impossible for investors to accurately measure the full breadth of
impact generated within an interrelated family of entities.66
61. Id.
62. See id. (“Impact Reporting and Investment Standards (IRIS) and Global Impact Investing
Rating System (GIIRS) provide standardized metrics for assessing some common output criteria. But
these focus more on an enterprise’s operations than on its products. With rare exceptions—most notably,
the field of microfinance—there have been few efforts to evaluate actual outcomes of market-based
social enterprises.”). With respect to malaria nets, for example, an enterprise could successfully produce
additional nets, but a reduction in malaria may be attributable to other factors such as increased access
to vaccines. Id.
63. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2020 EXAMINATION PRIORITIES: OFFICE OF
COMPLIANCE
INSPECTIONS
AND
EXAMINATIONS
15
(2020),
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EW4H-3UFF] (expressing “a particular interest in the accuracy and adequacy of
disclosures provided by RIAs offering clients new types or emerging investment strategies, such as
strategies focused on sustainable and responsible investing, which incorporate environmental, social,
and governance (ESG) criteria”).
64. See Alina Dizik, The Difficulty of Measuring a Company’s Social Impact, WALL ST. J. (June
24,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-difficulty-of-measuring-a-companys-social-impact11561379621 [https://perma.cc/M82H-TRYZ].
65. ABHILASH MUDALIAR, RACHEL BASS & HANNAH DITHRICH, GLOB. IMPACT INVESTING
NETWORK,
2018
ANNUAL
IMPACT
INVESTOR
SURVEY,
at
III
(2018),
https://thegiin.org/assets/2018_GIIN_Annual_Impact_Investor_Survey_webfile.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JX8X-QLSV].
66. See Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived,
42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 883–85 (2012) (contending that the complexity of corporate groups
requires tailored regulatory frameworks); Anita K. Krug, Escaping Entity-Centrism in Financial
Services Regulation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2039, 2043 (2013) (coining the term “entity centrism” to
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B. Social Impact Investing Has the Highest Potential for Impact Amongst
Socially Conscious Strategies
Commentators often use the terms ESG, SRI, and social impact investing
interchangeably. However, social impact investing is the only strategy that
directly prioritizes positive social impact. Social impact investing thus carries
the greatest potential to generate positive social impact in comparison to other
socially conscious strategies. While Registered Investment Companies (“RICs”)
are increasingly adopting aspects of these strategies, even socially conscious
RICs have limited social impact because of the federal securities laws’ publicprivate divide.
ESG refers to “the environmental, social, and governance practices of an
investment that may have a material impact on the performance of that
investment.”67 Advisers can therefore integrate ESG factors in performing
traditional financial valuations of prospective allocations. Nonetheless, even if a
fund adviser has disclosed its use of ESG factors in producing a portfolio
valuation, the adviser is not necessarily obligated to avoid allocations that are
deemed unethical under its ESG calculations.68
On the other hand, advisers that have adopted socially responsible investing
(“SRI”) strategies will not only utilize ESG factors (based on predetermined
ethical standards) in their valuations, but also actually choose or divest from
allocations based on those ESG valuations.69 As one commenter noted, “early
brand[s] of sustainable investing surfaced in response to rising demand for
investment funds that avoided areas certain groups deemed unethical. For
example, universities, nonprofit organizations, and religious institutions
increasingly stipulated that their portfolios exclude or withdraw investment in
the likes of tobacco or weapons manufacturers, as well those with significant
business interests in South Africa.”70 Fund advisers employing SRI strategies

argue that the law’s focus on the regulation of a single entity defeats the underlying purposes of such
regulations since entities “are components of groups of affiliated entities that, together, pursue related
or mutually beneficial activities as a larger enterprise—as an association of entities”). See generally
Carliss
N.
Chatman,
Corporate
Family
Matters,
SSRN
(Feb.
1,
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3697229
[https://perma.cc/BP8U-Q2GZ]
(arguing that consumers and investors may be manipulated into doing business with companies that
undermine their social values because of the veil of separateness within a “family” of corporate entities).
67. Zhou, supra note 24; see also GRIM & BERKOWITZ, supra note 24, at 4 (defining ESG
investing as an “activity that accounts for some type of environmental, social, or governance
consideration”).
68. See James Hester, Defining the Industry: SRI, ESG, and Impact Investing, IMPACTIVATE
(June 11, 2019), https://www.impactinvestingexchange.com/defining-the-industry-sri-esg-and-impactinvesting/ [https://perma.cc/X2CZ-3GD8]; see also Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer
Beware: Variation and Opacity in ESG and ESG Index Funds, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1921, 1927 (2020)
(“In all comparisons, we conclude that the ESG label acts more as a product signal and branding
mechanism than it does a promise of a specific investment strategy or avoided externalities.”).
69. See Hester, supra note 68.
70. Id.
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also commonly exclude fossil fuels, firearms, tobacco, and alcoholic
beverages.71
In contrast, according to a report published by Vanguard, “[social] impact
investing involves allocating capital to companies, organizations, and funds with
the intent to generate financial return and some form of material, positive social
[or]environmental impact that aligns with the investor’s personal values.”72 Fund
advisers that adopt social impact investing strategies therefore exclusively target
enterprises with a primary objective of creating goods, services, or technologies
that directly generate positive social or environmental impacts. Investing in a
start-up company that has created a novel technology for generating windpowered energy would be the perfect example of a social impact investment due
to its primary emphasis on creating a “clean” energy product. The desirability of
such impacts largely depends on the personal preferences of underlying investors
and advisers, along with the investment’s ability to generate some level of
returns, as the preceding section provided.
RICs available for investment by the general public, such as mutual funds,73
are increasingly employing a range of these socially conscious investment
strategies. Millions of households across the country rely on RICs to fund future
retirement costs, pay for college tuition, or pursue other long-term savings
goals.74 Socially conscious investing strategies have become the latest trend to
pervade the financial markets, potentially driven by millennial investors who
have an appetite for generating a positive impact from their investments. As
such, RICs have increasingly employed ESG screenings of prospective
allocations and have gradually adopted SRI strategies through a growing number
of passive index funds.
For instance, a plethora of exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”) dedicated to
ESG issues have cropped up in recent years.75 ETFs are passively managed RICs,
where the adviser simply allocates to baskets of financial instruments that follow
an index.76 ETF allocations can include bonds, commodities, equities, and other
71. Id.
72. GRIM & BERKOWITZ, supra note 24, at 15.
73. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, MUTUAL FUNDS AND ETFS: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS 4
(2016) [hereinafter MUTUAL FUNDS], https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutualfunds.pdf [https://perma.cc/33C2-F4FX] (summarizing how mutual funds work).
74. See Cary Martin Shelby, How Did We Get Here? Dissecting the Hedge Fund Conundrum
Though an Institutional Theory Lens, 74 BUS. LAW. 735, 742 (2019).
75. See Prableen Bajpai, How to Invest in ESG: Top ETFs to Consider, NASDAQ (Dec. 17,
2019),
https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/how-to-invest-in-esg%3A-top-etfs-to-consider-2019-12-17
[https://perma.cc/SW3M-VF83]; see also William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of
Exchange-Traded Funds: A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 69, 71–78 (2008) (discussing the exponential rise of ETFs).
76. See Birdthistle, supra note 75, at 72 (“In order to make possible this novel pricing
mechanism, ETF sponsors index their funds to benchmarks—such as the Standard & Poor’s 500
Composite Stock Price Index (S&P 500)—so that investors in an ETF can confirm that the price of the
fund’s shares at any given moment fairly equals the price of all the underlying securities in the fund’s
portfolio.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
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financial products.77 Fees are therefore significantly lower as the adviser is not
actively managing the assets of the fund.78 ETF ownership interests are publicly
traded, which is distinct from a typical mutual fund.79 ETFs are popular
investments for retail investors due to their lower fees and immediate access to
diversification.
ETFs also embrace social impact goals. According to one source,
“[e]xchange-traded funds (ETFs) that invest in securities with sustainability
goals are growing in popularity.”80 Further, “according to predictions from
BlackRock, the world’s largest asset management firm, sustainable ETF fund
assets are poised to grow from the current $25 billion to more than $400 billion
by 2028. Millennials, in particular, are attracted to these ETFs because they offer
low fees and broad diversification while catering to social impact goals.”81 In
fact, BlackRock has led the charge in incorporating socially conscious strategies
into many of its offered products.82 Index-mutual funds, which are not traded on
exchanges, can achieve similar results. Index-mutual funds are comparable to
ETFs in that they are structured to follow a particular index that tracks a range
of social impact investments.
RICs may also engage in socially conscious strategies. Some RICs actively
pursue companies that incorporate ESG principles or initiatives, or exercise SRI
strategies by withdrawing from companies that go against their core values. Such
strategies entail a strong shareholder activist role. Fund advisers may use their
power as institutional shareholders to shift initiatives of underlying allocations
towards more socially beneficial outcomes. This is a prevalent strategy in the
pension plan space, as “many large shareholders, like CalPERS, are active in the
public equity sector through shareholder activism: voting proxies, submitting
resolutions, and working with management for long-term positive change.”83
However, research has demonstrated that mutual fund advisers are far less likely

77. See id. at 78–80 (discussing the pricing mechanisms of ETFs, including how these create
opportunities “to invest in a diversified investment vehicle via shares that traded at accurate prices
throughout the business day”).
78. See id. at 72 (“Because a fund that merely tracks an existing index can be managed largely
with algorithms and trading programs, as opposed to human discretion, the cost to run—and,
accordingly, the price of investing in—these funds is often quite low.”).
79. See id. (“ETFs, on the other hand, and as their name suggests, can be traded on securities
exchanges constantly while their prices are updated every few seconds throughout the business day.”).
80. How Sustainable ETFs Let Small Investors Make a Difference, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON
(July 11, 2019), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/how-sustainable-etfs-let-small-investorsmake-a-social-impact/ [https://perma.cc/QB5V-FTNL].
81. Id.
82. See
generally
Sustainable
Investing,
BLACKROCK
(2021),
https://www.blackrock.com/za/individual/themes/sustainable-investing
[https://perma.cc/YQ9ANFXG] (outlining BlackRock’s commitment to sustainability, particularly ESG, through its investment
stewardship efforts).
83. Agnew & Seal Cove Fin., supra note 45, at 12.
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to perform this shareholder activist role and tend to vote alongside management
when given the discretion to do so.84
While RICs have responded to market pressures to provide mechanisms for
average investors to access socially conscious strategies, purchasing publicly
traded stock does little to affect overall societal impact as measured through an
economic lens. As noted by leading scholars,
Most economists agree that it is virtually impossible for a socially
motivated investor to increase the beneficial outputs of a publicly traded
corporation by purchasing its stock. Especially if—as is generally the
case—stock is purchased from existing shareholders, any benefit to the
company is highly attenuated if it exists at all. Impact investing typically
does not take place in large cap public markets, however, but rather in
domains subject to market frictions.85
However, the public-private divide under federal securities laws largely
constrains RICs from accessing more innovative investment opportunities. RICs
primarily allocate to baskets of publicly traded equities, bonds, and cash
instruments due to restrictions under federal securities laws that are rooted in
investor-protection principles.86
There are several reasons that purchasing stock in a publicly traded, socially
conscious company may have limited overall impact. Leading experts Paul Brest
and Kelly Born have asserted that impact only occurs in the context of
“additionality.”87 More specifically, “a particular investment has impact only if
it increases the quantity or quality of the enterprise’s social outcomes beyond
what would otherwise have occurred.”88 Thus, simply purchasing stock in a
publicly traded company driven by ESG goals will do little to increase overall
impact. Such stock is already traded in the secondary markets. If the company is
performing well, investors will flock to these opportunities irrespective of
whether such stocks are identified as socially conscious. With SRI strategies,
where socially conscious advisers are pulling from an investment that generates
negative impacts, socially neutral investors will seize the opportunity to purchase
the now-undervalued stock.89 Socially neutral investors’ trading activities may
counteract the positive impact initially generated by the socially conscious
investors.90

84. See Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493,
499 (2018) (“In the first place, proxy voting data seems to confirm that institutional investors take a
passive approach to governance. During the 2007 to 2009 proxy seasons, for example, mutual funds
proposed only 4.5% of all shareholder proposals, and only 0.9% addressed corporate governance or
performance issues.”).
85. Brest & Born, supra note 49, at 25.
86. See MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 73, at 4.
87. See Brest & Born, supra note 49, at 22–24.
88. Id. at 22.
89. See HILLEBRANDT & HALSTEAD, supra note 20, at 2–3.
90. See id.
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According to Brest and Born, impact “additionality” is most likely to occur
when particular investors can discern social impact investing opportunities that
average investors are unlikely to identify.91 These kinds of opportunities often
involve smaller start-up enterprises that are not yet publicly traded. They also
tend to include unique opportunities for social impact investments in developing
economies and emerging markets.
The implications of these limited opportunities for true impact will be
further explored in subsequent sections of this Article. Purchasing social impact
investing opportunities in smaller, private markets may yield greater
opportunities for impact and returns since such advisers have particularized
access to information required to exploit these unique opportunities.92 Yet, as
will be further discussed in Part II.C below, RICs are restricted from trading in
illiquid financial instruments, which are often a necessary component of social
impact investments.93
C. Federal Securities Law Excludes Targeted Communities from Social
Impact Investing Opportunities
The companies and projects that are the most socially impactful often
require long-term investment in private companies—both of which generally
exclude retail investors. Private equity funds, venture capital funds, and other
private funds (“Private Funds”) are the most utilized investment fund structures
for pursuing social impact investing strategies.94 This is likely due to the
regulatory flexibilities granted to such private entities. Private Funds are
unconstrained by the trading restrictions under the Investment Company Act of
1940 (“1940 Act”). This complex piece of legislation provides additional layers
of protection that extend well beyond the “truth in securities” framework of the
inaugural Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”). In addition to mandating additional disclosure
obligations, the 1940 Act imposes restrictions on RICs’ ability to trade in
“riskier” financial instruments and strategies. Consistent with the generally

91. See Brest & Born, supra note 49, at 25.
92. See id. at 26.
93. See Agnew & Seal Cove Fin., supra note 45, at 12.
Investment strategies and mutual funds are now offered in many flavors of ESG or
Sustainability. It requires some corporate soul-searching to identify both the broad mission
and the values of the organization as well as the process for implementing those values with
investment vehicles. Appropriate due diligence is needed to align the values and mission of
an organization with the investment objectives of the chosen funds and strategies. Some new
websites and databases collect information on investment vehicles in each asset class that
offer a combination of financial return and social impact.
Id.
94. See Emiko Kurotsu, Sara Terheggen & Linda Arnsbarger, Social Impact Funds: Structuring
Considerations, MORRISON & FOERSTER: MOFO IMPACT BLOG (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://impact.mofo.com/funding-financing/social-impact-funds-structuring-considerations/
[https://perma.cc/283A-PKT8].
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paternalistic nature of federal securities laws, the 1940 Act severely restricts the
extent to which RICs can trade in derivatives95 or engage in leveraged
transactions,96 since these activities may expose retail investors to excessive
losses.97
More importantly, Private Funds are not subject to standardized valuation
requirements under the 1940 Act. This makes it easier for private investors to
trade illiquid assets common in social impact investing.98 Even if Private Fund
advisers voluntarily adopt and disclose detailed valuation procedures, advisers
often grant themselves unfettered discretion to deviate from such procedures.99
Flexible valuation standards expand the categories of instruments that Private
Fund advisers can trade for their funds,100 enabling advisers to trade illiquid
instruments without facing the same liability risks as mutual fund advisers.101
Private fund advisers also have more flexibility to enter conflict of interest
transactions, which widen the scope of available social impact opportunities,
even if they reflect the idiosyncratic preferences of advisers.
By and large, the regulatory flexibilities that allow Private Funds to invest
in illiquid instruments make it easier for them to support innovative start-ups
requiring longer-term commitment horizons. Groundbreaking technologies that
generate positive social impact are often created by start-up companies that
initially rely on private capital before considering the transition to publicly traded
companies. As one source noted, “[a]lthough there are some public options,
impact investments are more often found in private markets (for instance green
tech venture capital),”102 that are typically illiquid in nature. Impact investments
into emerging and developing markets may similarly require long-term
commitment horizons due to the often unpredictable nature of surrounding

95. See 1 THOMAS P. LEMKE, GERALD T. LINS & A. THOMAS SMITH, III, REGULATION OF
INVESTMENT COMPANIES § 8.06 [2][b][ii] (Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed. 2020).
96. Id.; see also PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
THE
LESSONS
OF
LONG-TERM
CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT
A-1,
12
(1999),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf [https://perma.cc/X93ZZQPF] (“[T]he Investment Company Act of 1940 denies mutual funds such a high degree of leverage
by limiting their issuance of ‘senior securities.’ In practice, a mutual fund’s debt effectively may not
exceed 33 1/3% of its total assets.”). The amount of leverage employed by a particular hedge fund is
only limited to the extent requested by its actual counterparties. See LEMKE ET AL., supra note 95, § 8.06;
see also Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (defining “senior security” for the Act’s
asset coverage test); Rules and Regulations, Investment Companies Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 270 et seq.
(outlining the Act’s restrictions on RICs due to federal securities laws).
97. See MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 73, at 7.
98. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41)(B) (defining “value”); 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a–4 (defining “current
net asset value”); see also Ryan Sklar, Note, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors from Hedge Fund
Managers’ Conflicts of Interest, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3251, 3268 (2009) (noting that valuation models
are often developed by hedge fund managers based on unspecific and vague guidelines, which confines
an investor’s ability to police the valuation process).
99. See Sklar, supra note 98, at 3268–69.
100. See LEMKE ET AL., supra note 95, § 3.07.
101. See id.
102. GRIM & BERKOWITZ, supra note 24, at 16.
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socioeconomic climates. Comparable investments into communities through
educational ventures or community development projects may equally require
longer-term investments. Since RICs must also permit daily redemption requests
by their underlying investors under the 1940 Act, they are completely excluded
from making these kinds of flexible investment allocations.103
Private Funds access exemptions and regulatory flexibilities are not
available to RICs, resulting in a divide between public and private in the legal
framework under federal securities law.104 Private Funds restrict investments to
elite investors such as high net worth individuals or institutional investors and
receive flexibility under securities regulations.105 Elite investors presumably
have the resources to protect themselves sufficiently against fraudulent schemes
and riskier strategies.106 Under the most commonly utilized Securities Act
exemption, Private Funds must restrict investments to “accredited investors” in
exchange for the power to raise an unlimited amount of capital from an unlimited
number of investors. Accredited investors are statutorily defined as individuals
who earn over $200,000 per year, as well as a variety of institutions such as
insurance companies, pension plans, endowments, and other institutional
investors.107
Private Funds also utilize exemptions under the 1940 Act to exercise the
regulatory flexibilities needed to pursue social impact strategies. The most used
exemption under the 1940 Act imposes even higher income and net worth
standards for individual investors. Private Funds rely on the Section 3(c)(7)
exemption under the 1940 Act because it allows them to raise an unlimited
amount of capital while accepting an unlimited number of investors if the fund
is restricted to “Qualified Purchasers.”108 These investors include institutions and
natural persons with at least $5,000,000 in investments.109
However, an extremely low percentage of individuals meets these income
and net worth thresholds. With respect to accredited investors, some estimates
provide that roughly 8.9 percent of the U.S. population met this threshold in
2019.110 A significantly lower percentage of the U.S. population meets the
Qualified Purchaser standard, and an even lower percentage presumably does so
on a global scale. As a result, most community members who are the targeted
103. See, e.g., Investment Company Registration and Regulation Package, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N
(Feb.
19,
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/investment/fastanswers/divisionsinvestmentinvcoreg121504htm.html [https://perma.cc/XD5W-EP2T].
104. See de Fontenay, supra note 19, at 447–52.
105. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2020).
106. See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–27 (1953).
107. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7).
109. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(i)–(ii).
110. Ben Jessel, Legal and Regulatory Experts Weigh in on the SEC’s Proposed Changes to the
Accredited
Investor
Status,
FORBES
(Jan.
21,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/benjessel/2020/01/21/legal-and-regulatory-experts-weigh-in-on-thesecs-proposed-changes-to-the-accredited-investor-status/ [https://perma.cc/ECE7-CZXU].
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beneficiaries of many social impact vehicles are completely excluded from
accessing these entities as investors. Recently enacted crowdfunding exemptions
permit a degree of retail investment into privately held start-up companies.111
But, many social impact investors do not rely on these exemptions due to their
$1,070,000 capital raising cap coupled with arduous disclosure requirements.112
This legally sanctioned exclusion of retail investors can lead to negative
externalities. Although elite investors often negotiate for additional layers of
transparency and accountability from Private Fund advisers, their interests are
often not closely aligned with the broader community goals applicable to
targeted beneficiaries. And while they have greater latitude to advocate for
particularized social impact goals given their enhanced bargaining power as elite
investors, their selections can be misguided given the limited participation of
targeted community members, which can lead to declines in net social welfare.113
The limited incentives of both advisers and the small pool of qualified investors
to calculate and disclose net social welfare can cause significant unintended
harms.
II.
THE PROBLEM: PRIVILEGED ACCESS PRODUCES UNINTENDED HARMS
When impacted communities are excluded from social impact investing,
those investments may fail to live up to their potential—and may actually harm
the communities they are intended to serve. As detailed in the preceding section,
elite investors have greater access to impact as they can freely access strategies
that incorporate ESG and SRI, and have almost exclusive access to social impact
investing, which arguably carries the greatest impact potential. Moreover, there
111. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100 (2020).
112. See Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 281, 284–85 (2014).
113. See Alyssa Ely & Denise Hearn, Impact Investors Need to Share Power, Not Just Capital,
STAN.
SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.
(Apr.
14,
2021),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/impact_investors_need_to_share_power_not_just_capital
(“[M]oving
capital to communities of color or women, on its own, does not achieve equity. The way capital is shared,
and the power dynamics underlying that process, is equally important.” ); see also GRAY ET AL., supra
note 51, at 19.
In traditional investment arrangements between fund managers and investors, GPs are held
by professional standards and legal requirements to make investment decisions that deliver
maximum risk-adjusted financial returns for LPs. In the context of impact investing, many
LPs expect that investment decisions include a consideration of social or environmental
impact. GPs must weigh their fiduciary duty to their LPs with the impact mission of the fund.
[Wharton Social Impact Investing] asked respondents to report the level of structural
protection for fund managers to consider non-fiduciary factors in their investment decisions.
Unsurprisingly, survey respondents report the vast majority of Limited Partnership
Agreements, Private Placement Memoranda, or other comparable investment agreements
either explicitly allow or, in most cases, require fund managers to consider mission in
investment decisions. Specifically, 90% have investment or legal documents that explicitly
allow fund managers to consider social and/or environmental issues and 70% go so far as to
require them to do so.
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is no mandate that requires community input or involvement with respect to the
selection and operation of such projects, and private ordering is unlikely to fill
that gap.114 Without the meaningful participation of affected communities as
either investors or managers within social impact funds, potential harms of these
investments will likely reduce the net social benefits. Unlike members of the
targeted investment community, elite investors and managers are not wellpositioned to foresee negative externalities. Since social impact investment
vehicles mostly operate in the private sphere, advisers face limited accountability
from the surrounding community or public at large in scrutinizing their
decisions. Many parties have proffered privately ordered solutions to these
problems.115 However, the lack of mandatory compliance and standardization of
privately ordered solutions creates unintended harms.
These harms can be significant. Environmentally conscious investments
have led to deforestation, contamination, and pollution.116 Community
development investments have caused gentrification and displacement.117
Organizations created to administer socially conscious investments have resisted
accountability and actively abused the communities they were created to
serve.118 Each of these harms are disproportionately borne by Black
communities, Indigenous communities, and other communities of color. And
investors continue to profit. New investment opportunities may spring up to fix
the problems created by old, failed programs. More pain—more profit. And
investors will do well, thinking they are doing good. While social impact
investing is still in its infancy relative to other categories of private investments,
exploring innovative reforms is essential in mitigating these vicious cycles.
A. Limited Net Social Benefit Analysis in the Private Sector
A countervailing problem with private actors performing public
functions—or privately ordered solutions to public problems—is that the private
sphere can obscure its inability to fully account for a range of anticipated and
unanticipated harms experienced by the general public. By further empowering
exempt vehicles that are primarily engaged in social impact investing, federal
securities laws exacerbate this problem. The public sector typically utilizes
detailed cost benefits analyses to make informed decisions on whether to pursue
a particular policy or project.119 Administrative agencies such as the Securities

114. See infra Part II.B.
115. See infra Part II.D.
116. See infra Part II.B.
117. See infra Part II.B.
118. See infra Part II.B.
119. See ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN, DAVID H. GREENBERG, AIDAN R. VINING & DAVID L.
WEIMER, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 2 (4th ed. 2017); see also CONG.
BUDGET OFF., 10 THINGS TO KNOW ABOUT CBO 1 (2021), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/10Things-CBO-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/HVD6-LJMC] (“[The Congressional Budget Office] was
established under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to provide objective, nonpartisan information
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and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) similarly produce and publicly disclose a cost-benefit analysis prior to
adopting a rule or regulation.120 The private sector is under no such obligation,
and potential negative externalities of social impact investments may
accordingly be understudied and undisclosed.
A comprehensive measure of net social benefits is often included within
public investment decisions, which calculate whether total benefits to society
exceed costs.121 Costs incorporate any direct expenses associated with launching
the underlying projects such as construction expenditures, compliance costs, and
even forgone tax revenue.122 Any resulting negative externalities should also be
included within these costs, which occur when third parties, who are not direct
participants in the transaction, bear spillover costs such as an increase in water,
air, or noise pollution, or unanticipated effects such as the crowding out of
superior alternatives.
The net social benefits included in public investment calculations
encompass the private gains that are received by the parties directly involved in
the underlying transaction, as well as any positive externalities generated by the
same transaction.123 Positive externalities occur when third parties, who are not
direct participants in the transaction, experience benefits such as the reduction of
air and water pollution, or an increase in surrounding property values.124 Benefits
can also include reducing negative externalities.125 Debates contest what kinds
of costs and benefits should be included in these calculations, as well as the

that would support the budget process . . . CBO is also required by law to produce a formal cost estimate
for nearly every bill that is approved by a full committee of either the House or the Senate.”).
120. See Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30
YALE J. REGUL. 289, 295–308 (2013) (providing historical analysis of SEC’s provision of cost benefit
analyses with respect to proposed rules); Economic and Cost Analysis for Air Pollution Regulations,
U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/economic-and-cost-analysis-airpollution-regulations [https://perma.cc/UA3Y-H88Q] (disclosing reports related to cost benefit analyses
of various EPA programs and rules); see also Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17,
1981) (requiring agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of any proposed or finalized rule); Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (requiring executive agencies to perform and
disclose cost benefit analyses prior to adopting prospective rules).
121. See Martin S. Feldstein, Net Social Benefit Calculation and the Public Investment Decision,
16 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 114, 114 (1964); see also What Is Net Social Benefit, IGI GLOB.,
https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/some-economics-of-conservation-of-cultural-heritage/62132
[https://perma.cc/9HML-XZ6J] (defining net social benefit as “the increase in the welfare of a society
that is derived from a particular course of action. Some social benefits, such as greater social justice,
cannot easily be quantified”).
122. See BARRY P. KEATING & MARYANN O. KEATING, BASIC COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR
ASSESSING LOCAL PUBLIC PROJECTS 48–49 (Philip J. Romero & Jeffrey A. Edwards eds., 2014).
123. See
Social
Benefits,
ECON.
ONLINE,
https://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Definitions/Social_benefit.html [https://perma.cc/9UR8-GJGJ]
(defining social benefits as “private benefits gained by individuals directly involved in a transaction
together with the external benefits gained by third parties not directly involved in the transaction”).
124. See KEATING & KEATING, supra note 122, at 47.
125. See id.
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extent to which certain benefits are even quantifiable.126 Political and economic
shifts have caused commentators to be more skeptical of the costs associated
with government intervention.127 Even still, the availability and public scrutiny
of such studies is essential given government intervention’s potential impact on
surrounding communities.
The obligation to consider net social benefits conflicts with the fiduciary
obligations of private sector actors. While the public sector seeks to maximize
net social benefits through policy decisions, the private sector seeks to maximize
profits and shareholder wealth. Private sector actors are not required to maximize
net social welfare, particularly since doing so could cause such actors to run afoul
of their fiduciary duties. In the corporate context, directors are bound by an
assortment of fiduciary duties that require them to place the interests of the
corporate entity and its underlying shareholders ahead of their own personal
interests.128 In the investment advisory context, fiduciary duties automatically
obligate advisers to act in the best interests of their fund clients.129 A rich blend
of studies have theorized the extent to which directors can or should consider
outside stakeholder interests in making decisions on behalf of corporations.130

126. See, e.g., David Dayen, Congress’s Biggest Obstacle, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://prospect.org/politics/congress-biggest-obstacle-congressional-budget-office
[https://perma.cc/9XM4-GBF4] (“Congress has created a structure to simply [consider] the costs
[implicit in CBO scores] without the benefits. That mentality must change if we’re to have a decent
conversation about the role of government.”).
127. See, e.g., Gabriel Ehrlich & Ryan Nunn, Eliminating In-House CBO Scoring Would Be
‘Profoundly Unwise,’ THE HILL: BLOG (Aug. 2, 2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/economy-budget/344913-rep-meadows-plan-to-to-end-in-house-cbo-scoring-profoundly
[https://perma.cc/Y7LE-H452] (“CBO’s budgetary analysis has, at times, drawn criticism from both
Republicans and Democrats. Some Republicans have recently lambasted the agency’s scoring of efforts
to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act. But in other instances, CBO’s analysis has been criticized
by Democrats. For example, during the debate preceding passage of the Affordable Care Act, several
prominent Democrats questioned the reliability of CBO analysis showing higher-than-expected costs of
Democratic healthcare reform proposals.”).
128. See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW
283–313 (5th ed. 2018) (providing a comprehensive overview of the fiduciary duties that automatically
apply to corporate directors).
129. See Anita K. Krug, Moving Beyond the Clamor for “Hedge Fund Regulation”: A
Reconsideration of “Client” Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 55 VILL. L. REV. 661, 662–63
(2010) (revealing that investment advisers owe fiduciary duties directly to their fund clients, as opposed
to the individual investors within those funds, and further arguing that this unique fiduciary structure
denies such individual investors essential protections under federal securities laws).
130. See generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012) (debunking the
notion that directors are obligated to maximize shareholder value, and further advocating that they are
empowered to consider outside stakeholder interests in managing the long-term interests of
corporations); Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors’
Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 409, 414 (2002) (concluding that “corporate law allows directors of post-conversion
companies to take actions that advance the interests of their beneficiaries, even when those actions fail
to generate the maximum level of shareholder profit”); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law
After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 10 (2015) (stating that “corporate law confers on [directors] broad
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Yet, completely prioritizing public sector interests is a relatively new
phenomenon for Private Funds hoping to simultaneously earn returns while
making a measurable impact on society. Corporations or advisers that are
organized as benefit corporations have actually agreed to balance shareholder
interests with broader stakeholder interests, such as employees, communities, or
society at large.131 This novel legal designation for business structures has
arguably made it easier for social entrepreneurs to pursue socially desirable goals
without running afoul of shareholder and corporate fiduciary duties.132 More than
thirty-five states have statutorily authorized benefit corporations, which typically
include accountability measures and transparency requirements to either
shareholders or the general public.133
Even with this new avenue for prioritizing broader social goals, benefit
corporations are still subject to widespread criticism by corporate law scholars.
One common area of criticism is the lack of standardized mechanisms for
measuring and disclosing public benefits.134 For instance, some benefit
corporation statutes require disclosures to both shareholders and the general
public with respect to their measured public benefit, while others only require
disclosures to shareholders—who may have limited incentives to represent the
interests of outside stakeholders.135 There is no universal obligation for benefit
corporations to perform comprehensive assessments of net social benefits for
anticipated projects, which would necessarily entail evaluating any negative
externalities generated by such projects. There is also no universal requirement
for participation or insights from targeted community members which could
prevent such negative externalities from occurring in the first place. Further,
social impact entrepreneurs are not required to organize their ventures as benefit
corporations, making these additional, albeit limited, protections inapplicable to
the bulk of private actors acting in this capacity.
Despite the limited requirement of corporate actors to perform net social
benefit analyses, at least one group of scholars has applied it to evaluate whether
discretion to determine the extent to which they choose to temper the pursuit of profit by regard for other
values”).
131. See Press Release, CSRwire, Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation
Legislation (Apr. 14, 2010), https://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-First-State-inUnion-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation [https://perma.cc/D3EV-SDPF].
132. See id.
133. See generally State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP.,
https://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/9527-UV5Y] (cataloging
which states have passed benefit corporation legislation); CHRISTOPHER WIRTH, DRINKER BIDDLE &
REATH
LLP,
BENEFIT
CORPORATION
REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
(2015),
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit%20Corporations%20Chart.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UKX9-8DJT] (providing summary charts of applicable state’s benefit corporation
reporting requirements).
134. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?,
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 604 (2011) (highlighting some of the varying disclosure rules of benefit
corporation statutes).
135. See id. at 604.
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corporate managers are maximizing decisions with respect to their corporate
social responsibility (“CSR”) activities.136 CSR is fundamentally different than
social impact investing, although it falls along the same continuum of socially
conscious strategies. It generally refers to self-imposed obligations for
companies to be socially accountable to outside stakeholders, including but not
limited to their surrounding environments, while “embody[ing] the economic,
legal, ethical, and discretionary categories of business performance.”137 It can
include engaging in philanthropic efforts, promoting internal employment
policies that serve to increase diversity, or engaging in business activities that
are beneficial to the environment. The authors of the aforementioned study
suggest that firms employing CSR mechanisms should invest in projects that
yield the highest degrees of net social welfare.138 They identified the following
limitations in managers selecting optimal CSR choices:
First, firms’ CSR investment choices are influenced by managers’ personal
preferences and by firm characteristics. . . . Second, although firms may be
well informed about the private costs of CSR, they may have little
experience evaluating its social benefits, leading them to choose inefficient
levels of environmental protection effort. Third, firms may fail to consider
alternative mechanisms to achieve their social goals. For example, firms
may be able to achieve higher social returns by donating profits to charities,
which are dedicated exclusively to the task of improving social welfare and
thus presumably are well-suited to the task.139
The authors similarly identified several possible benefits resulting from
CSR activities within the corporate context, such as firms gaining “access to
private information about their current and future pollution activities, including
control costs[,] . . . [which] can lead firms to identify better policies than less
well-informed government agencies.”140 However, it still remains questionable
whether private actors can sufficiently overcome their inherent limitations in
identifying and calculating net social benefits. These limitations largely arise
from private actors attempting to perform public functions, when they lack
experience doing so and are not legally mandated to fill in social benefit gaps.
The lack of public accountability with respect to the private arena in which the
bulk of social impact investing occurs reduces the incentives to rectify these
deficiencies.

136. See Forest L. Reinhardt, Robert N. Stavins & Richard H. K. Vietor, Corporate Social
Responsibility Through an Economic Lens (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 13989,
2008),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w13989/w13989.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AA34-RWZC].
137. Archie B. Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, 4
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 497, 499 (1979).
138. See Reinhardt et al., supra note 136, at 25.
139. Id. at 26–27.
140. Id. at 27.
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Exacerbated by the federal securities laws’ public-private divide, the
private sector’s lack of robust net social benefit analysis and public disclosure
contributes to the difficulty in understanding and preventing negative
externalities caused by social impact investments. Two recent developments
have increased private social impact investing’s focus on net social benefit.
Benefit corporations permit corporate actors to consider stakeholder interests,
although they suffer from a lack of standardization. CSR obligations privately
tie corporate actors to social impact accountability, despite a lack of public
accountability. While each provides some additional means to prioritize net
social benefit, neither has proven sufficient to eliminate the negative externalities
associated with private social impact investing.
B. Increased Potential for Negative Externalities
The same analytical framework utilized in the aforementioned study on
CSR can be applied to evaluate the net social benefits—including negative
externalities—of social impact investments. Like CSR’s inherent limitations in
asking private actors to perform public functions, private entities have limited
expertise in managing and optimizing social enterprises. They are likewise free
to make investments based on biases and personal preferences as opposed to
optimizing selections among a variety of alternative options. Even if they are
organized as benefit corporations, they have limited fiduciary duties to the
general public.
While many social impact investors compile consolidated impact
statements to harmonize impact reporting across their portfolios,141 others fail to
make these voluntary assessments, increasing the likelihood of impact washing.
These consolidated statements can also reflect the overall impact or negative
externalities generated by social impact investors through their collective
allocations. In addition, social impact investors often form strategic relationships
with their underlying portfolio companies. This can occur through board
participation, voting rights,142 and other granular management decisions such as
141. See, e.g., Cool Tool: Consolidated Impact Is the Goal of iPAR Reporting for Investors and
Fund Managers, IMPACTALPHA (Apr. 26, 2016), https://impactalpha.com/cool-tool-consolidatedimpact-is-the-goal-of-ipar-reporting-for-investors-and-fund-managers-6d20db66e00a/
[https://perma.cc/QYF5-A46V].
142. See Christopher Charles Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto & Anne M. Tucker,
Contracts with (Social) Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming
2021)
(manuscript
at
3),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X21000179/pdfft?md5=9046b649bc73c3
b2bba510032bd2ec4a&pid=1-s2.0-S0304405X21000179-main.pdf [https://perma.cc/THV4-TK4N]
(concluding that social impact investors often secure board seats or voting rights of their underlying
portfolio companies); see also Steven E. Boschner & Amy L. Simmerman, The Venture Capital Board
Member’s Survival Guide: Handling Conflicts Effectively While Wearing Two Hats, 41 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1 (2016) ( “Venture firms often invest very early in a company’s life cycle and, as a result, own a
sizeable percentage of the company at the outset. With these early investments, venture capitalists
frequently negotiate for a position on the corporation’s board of directors, as well as equity holdings that
come with certain contractual and corporate charter-based preferences over the common stock in areas
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determining the ways in which portfolio companies measure and disclose impact.
Nevertheless, if social impact investors are passive in effectuating these roles,
then their underlying operating companies face a higher likelihood of generating
negative externalities. Moreover, social impact investors are providing
somewhat of a gatekeeping role for socially conscious industries in that these
start-up companies frequently rely on social impact investors to provide vital
rounds of venture capital funding. However, these socially conscious industries
can produce negative externalities without proper oversight and disclosure.
To combat these limitations, social impact managers should actively
engage in the process of optimizing net social benefits. This entails calculating
the anticipated increase to private benefits and positive externalities, as well as
any resulting costs, which would include an estimation of any negative
externalities. However, there is very limited proof that this occurs on a wide scale
basis. Evidence reveals the sparse interactions that social impact managers have
with community members that are the targeted beneficiaries of underlying
projects:143
Successful businesses continuously update their knowledge of what
customers want. Walmart collects more than 2.5 million gigabytes of
customer data per hour and Yelp users post 26,380 reviews per minute.
So why do many impact investors, who seek social, environmental, and
economic returns on patient timelines, park customer insight at the door
when they want to achieve multiple bottom lines? It’s a question I’ve
asked more than 500 senior business executives from 90 countries who
have attended the Oxford Impact Investing and Oxford Social Finance
programs at Saïd Business School over the past six years. And it’s one
I’ve pursued in research involving 1,200 social investors across 20
countries. Their answers indicate they think of social impact
beneficiaries differently than commercial customers. But they
shouldn’t. Overlooking any target customers’ needs can lead to failed
investments.144
Social impact managers’ miscalculation of net social benefits is implicit
within this lack of engagement. Social impact managers’ troubling assumption
that even incremental increases to positive externalities serve to enhance social
welfare is likely the root cause of many costly and devastating negative
externalities generated by social impact investments. Ongoing conversations and
studies with affected community members through enhanced due diligence
procedures could have reduced or even eliminated the occurrence of these
such as the divvying up of proceeds in a merger, protection against certain types of future dilution, and
special voting rights.”).
143. See Gayle Peterson, Three Community Feedback Tools for Impact Investors, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.
(Dec.
19,
2018),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/three_community_feedback_tools_for_impact_investors
[https://perma.cc/Q2CC-A26F] (revealing that large numbers of impact investors do not see the need
for obtaining feedback from affected community members regarding underlying projects).
144. Id.
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negative externalities. Since social impact investors are not required to
internalize these costs due to the limited liability nature of these investments,
there are limited incentives to prevent them from occurring.
A common category of such negative externalities occurs when a seemingly
clean energy impact investment inadvertently destroys a surrounding
environment or habitat. An example of this transpired when Buchanan
Renewables, a company that touted its social impact projects, created a plan to
convert latent rubber trees into biomass chips that could be used to supply
electricity to Monrovia, Libya.145 When the project failed after the company
determined that it was no longer economically viable, many of the biomass chips
that were left behind contaminated surrounding natural water supplies.146 In
addition, according to some sources, “the lack of old rubber trees is contributing
to deforestation in the area as local charcoal producers in search for wood are
now cutting down trees in nearby threatened natural forest.”147 Workers who
were severely injured as a result of the project’s operations were left with little
to no recourse.148 Reports of rampant sexual abuse committed by the project’s
employees also arose from surrounding community members who were the
targeted beneficiaries of this project.149
Even in the United States, where an enhanced network of interlocking state
and federal regulations could prevent such cascading harms, private industries
have an insidious history of targeting marginalized communities for hazardous
waste disposal among other harmful activities. For instance, Professors Paul
Mohai and Robin Saha found “a consistent pattern over a 30-year period of
placing hazardous waste facilities in neighborhoods where poor people and
people of color live.”150 They similarly concluded that,
Racial discrimination in zoning and the housing market, along with siting
decisions based on following the path of least resistance, may best explain
present-day inequities . . . hazardous waste sites are often built in
neighborhoods where whites have already been moving out, and poor
minority residents have been moving in, for a decade or two before the

145. See Liberian Communities Still Suffering from Failed Bioenergy Project, SWEDWATCH
(May 25, 2018), https://swedwatch.org/en/regions/africa-south-of-the-sahara/liberian-communitiesstill-suffering-failed-bioenergy-project/ [https://perma.cc/4R3P-3F5H].
146. Ronnie Greene & Jonathan Paye-Layleh, US Loans Fueled Insider Deal, Failed Power Plan
in
Liberia,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Jan.
27,
2015),
https://apnews.com/52cad7bc134d4057a76b6a8cf2263c1a/us-loans-fueled-insider-deal-failed-powerplan-liberia [https://perma.cc/7KW9-Q3AS].
147. See Liberian Communities Still Suffering from Failed Bioenergy Project, supra note 145.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Jim Erickson, Targeting Minority, Low-Income Neighborhoods for Hazardous Waste Sites,
UNIV. OF MICH. NEWS (Jan. 19, 2016), https://news.umich.edu/targeting-minority-low-incomeneighborhoods-for-hazardous-waste-sites/ [https://perma.cc/SB89-69S8].
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project arrived. Such changes may result in a further eroding of resources
and political clout in these neighborhoods.151
Scholars have likewise found a correlation between these higher rates of
pollution and the higher rate of asthma among Black people in this country.152
Social impact investments would presumably be designed to mitigate harms of
this nature. However, this disturbing history provides ample reasons to be wary
of emerging technologies and developments that can inadvertently lead to even
more harms, particularly when they are allowed to operate within such a
heightened zone of opacity under federal securities laws.
Social impact investments that are ill conceived and poorly executed can
also crowd out higher-quality products or services that have greater impact.
Investing in a solar production company for instance may appear to be beneficial
for the environment on its face.153 However, the company might produce lower
quality solar panels than existing competitors.154 If social impact investing then
crowds out superior competitors from the marketplace, it will have a negative
effect on the surrounding environment.155 This “crowding out” effect is more
likely to occur if social impact investing is concessionary in nature.156 A scenario
of this nature could also lead to lost jobs of such crowded-out competitors,
leading to yet an additional negative externality.
This crowding-out phenomenon becomes even more problematic in the
context of the provision of social services, where the public sphere could be
crowded out of the market by social impact investors despite being better
equipped to prioritize community needs. For instance, social impact investors
may increase allocations to charter schools and other private modes of education
particularly given the new tax incentives associated with investing in distressed
communities that are identified as opportunity zones.157 This could crowd out
public school alternatives despite the well-documented harms of charter

151.
152.

Id.
See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, EPA 100-F-08-029, CHILDREN’S ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH DISPARITIES: BLACK AND AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN AND ASTHMA (2008),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-05/documents/hd_aa_asthma.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UW6N-ZVKN].
153. See Kelsey Piper, “Impact Investment” Funds Advertise Great Returns and Social Impacts.
They
Aren’t
Delivering.,
VOX
(Dec.
19,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2018/12/18/18136214/impact-investing-socially-responsible-sri-report
[https://perma.cc/7BQH-S4MP].
154. See id.
155. See Wendy Abt, Almost Everything You Know About Impact Investing Is Wrong, STAN.
SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.
(Dec.
18,
2018),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/almost_everything_you_know_about_impact_investing_is_wrong
[https://perma.cc/B5ET-XWBX].
156. See id.
157. See e.g., Medema, supra note 16; ECON. INNOVATION GRP., THE TAX BENEFITS OF
INVESTING IN OPPORTUNITY ZONES (2018), https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Tax-Benefitsof-Investing-in-Opportunity-Zones.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BQ4-DM4S].
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schools.158 Even still, targeted communities will have limited access to
disclosures related to such allocations given the federal securities laws’ archaic
dichotomy between public and private investments.
Beyond crowding out of businesses and publicly funded services, social
impact strategies can also crowd out entire communities, and lead to the
wholesale displacement of the very communities they are intended to serve. As
one example, social impact investors are now targeting opportunity zones (“OZ”)
as a potential avenue for “doing well, while doing good.”159 The 2017 Tax Cut
and Jobs Act created these zones to incentivize private investment in the over
8,000 designated neighborhood “zones” that are deemed economically
distressed.160 This legislation effectively reduces the tax rate of capital gains that
are reinvested in these distressed neighborhoods.161 While other categories of
businesses can invest in OZ, the long-term investment horizons for receiving
such tax benefits, as well as the easily touted benefit of “doing well” by spurring
private investment in distressed communities invite social impact investing.162
However, this legislation failed to include any concrete obligations to report or
measure any identified impact objectives for enterprises taking advantage of
these tax breaks.163 The law similarly fails to include any requirements that
community members within these designated zones must benefit from any
housing units or jobs created by these investments.164 Moreover, such
community members are highly unlikely to generate the capital gains that would
trigger the tax breaks guaranteed under this law. Concerns have therefore arisen
from community groups, lawmakers, and other commentators that these projects
will lead to the gentrification of targeted communities, which will benefit the
wealthy at the expense and to the detriment of the poor.165

158. See Strauss, supra note 17.
159. See Anne Field, Tapping Opportunity Zones, Social Impact Investor SoLa Raises Its Biggest
Fund, FORBES (May 31, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2019/05/31/tappingopportunity-zones-social-impact-investor-sola-raises-its-biggest-fund/
[https://perma.cc/7TKEMV4E]; Elise Hansen, Fifth Third Bank Pledges $100M for Opportunity Zone Projects, LAW360 (Jan.
24, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1237388/fifth-third-bank-pledges-100m-for-opportunityzone-projects [https://perma.cc/X29Q-H7X9].
160. See Amy Cortese, Fifth Third Bank Commits $100 Million to Impact-Focused Opportunity
Zone Projects, IMPACTALPHA (Jan. 27, 2020), https://impactalpha.com/fifth-third-bank-commits-100million-to-impact-focused-opportunity-zone-projects [https://perma.cc/GSS8-5JPH].
161. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z–2 (outlining and defining the Special Rules for Capital
Gains Invested in Opportunity Zones).
162. See Matthew Erskine, Qualified Opportunity Zone Investments: Does It Make Sense During
the
Covid
19
Crisis?,
FORBES
(Dec.
8,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewerskine/2020/12/08/qualified-opportunity-zone-investmentsdoes-it-make-sense-during-the-covid-19-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/BY9P-MHCE].
163. See Oscar Perry Abello, Boulder Presses Pause on Some Opportunity Zone Development,
NEXT CITY (Mar. 6, 2019), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/boulder-presses-pause-on-someopportunity-zone-development [https://perma.cc/9QZG-W8R2].
164. See id.
165. See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Jesse Drucker, Lawmakers Increase Criticism of ‘Opportunity Zone’
Tax Break, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/business/opportunity-
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Early studies and anecdotal evidence seem to suggest that at least some
such concerns are coming into fruition. While one study concluded that a sample
of opportunity zone investments led to a “small increase in liquidity at the end
of the sample period and evidence of more vacant land sales,” it also found that
“the OZ program does not yet show any general effects on land price
appreciation [and] [t]he estimated effects are temporarily and spatially limited,
and do not affect all properties of all types equally.”166 Other reports have
revealed that opportunity zone investors seem to be targeting projects related to
luxury real estate developments as opposed to affordable housing that would
directly benefit surrounding communities.167 These sorts of developments could
also lead to increased property taxes, further pushing out members of these
targeted communities who may not be able to afford these increased rates. “This
leaves room for bigger conglomerates such as Whole Foods and Starbucks to
come in, leading to a displacement of residents due to a rise in rent and retail
prices.”168 Smaller black-owned businesses located in marginalized communities
could similarly be pushed out of business by these larger conglomerates.
Interestingly enough, minority depository institutions and community
development financial institutions do not qualify for opportunity zone tax
benefits despite the important role that they play in disadvantaged
communities.169
Providing a mechanism to require input from community members that are
the targeted beneficiaries of these investments could reduce at least some of the
negative externalities generated by these schemes. As investors, affected
community members would yield more power to negotiate for additional
disclosures related to impact, and to vote on key issues pertaining to the ways in
which these projects are managed. Managers of social impact investments that
include affected community members as investors would likewise face greater
incentives to manage the vehicle in a way that serves to benefit community
member investors. While many such investments may be too risky for
zones-congress-criticism.html [https://perma.cc/F6HF-2JB7] (reporting that “[t]wo Democrats and a
Republican on the House Ways and Means Committee introduced a bill on Wednesday to require funds
that invest in opportunity zones to file annual reports with the Treasury that disclose details of their
development projects and any new businesses”).
166. Alan Sage, Mike Langen & Alex van de Minne, Where Is the Opportunity in Opportunity
Zones?
36
(Feb.
19,
2021)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3385502 [https://perma.cc/N8YF-TBVJ].
167. See Sophie Quinton, Black Businesses Largely Miss Out on Opportunity Zone Money, PEW:
STATELINE
(June
24,
2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2020/06/24/black-businesses-largely-miss-out-on-opportunity-zone-money
[https://perma.cc/L8ZW-YBFV].
168. Tracey Onyenacho, How Opportunity Zones Are Hurting the Growth of Low-Income Black
Neighborhoods, BLAVITY (July 15, 2019), https://blavity.com/blavity-original/how-opportunity-zonesare-hurting-the-growth-of-low-income-black-neighborhoods [https://perma.cc/R8HA-2KX2].
169. See James R. Barth & Kenneth Kelly, Missed Opportunity Zone Investments: MinorityOwned Banks, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.crainsdetroit.com/othervoices/missed-opportunity-zone-investments-minority-owned-banks [https://perma.cc/CXU2-FDMU].
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community member participation, particularly concerning emerging and
untested technologies, others may provide innovative opportunities to
economically participate in and benefit from the development of projects that
impact their surrounding communities.
As managers, community members would be empowered to dictate directly
how the project is developed and implemented to protect against the wholesale
displacement of their communities. Targeted beneficiaries are more familiar with
the unique characteristics and risks of their surrounding communities, many of
which are labeled as “unforeseen” to outsiders. Including targeted community
members within some level of management could help to ensure that such costs
are fully accounted for, or at least considered.
Even if the inclusion of targeted community members as managers or
investors is unfeasible from a regulatory and practical perspective, requiring
advance notice, consultation, or informed consent of future projects could
provide additional mechanisms for reducing such unanticipated harms. Given
the opaque environment in which these vehicles operate, there are limited
opportunities for accountability. By and large, the antiquated ways in which
federal securities laws distinguish between public and private investment
schemes contributes to the harms discussed herein. A new set of exemptions for
social impact investments would incorporate both the private and public
elements of social impact investing strategies while introducing new
mechanisms for regulating the increasing publicness of these schemes.
C. Resulting Opaqueness Under Federal Securities Laws Reduces
Opportunities for Accountability
Since the public-private divide under the federal securities laws reduces the
disclosure obligations for privately held companies, social impact investors
operate in a zone of opacity. Both affected community members and the public
at large lack access to meaningful information related to projects financed by
social impact investments. As a result, it is virtually impossible to know with any
degree of certainty the extent to which social impact investors are optimizing net
social benefits in selecting their allocations. For all we know given existing
disclosure requirements, advisers could be selecting social impact opportunities
based on undisclosed conflicts of interest or idiosyncratic personal preferences,
as opposed to selecting opportunities that generate optimal impact within a
particular community.
Under existing federal securities laws, social impact investors can similarly
abandon meaningful due diligence procedures related to the potential adverse
effects that these investments can generate. This is quite troubling given the welldocumented negative externalities that have occurred in a myriad of distressed
communities within the project development space.170 The restrictions on
170.

See supra Part II.B.
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targeted beneficiaries’ participation in social impact investments—which could
mitigate these negative externalities before they occur—exacerbate the alreadylimited transparency of social impact investments.
Elite investors have access to varying degrees of information regarding
their investments but do not have sufficient incentive to use that information to
protect targeted communities from unintended harms. Many receive disclosures
in the form of private placement memoranda and other periodic disclosure
documents consistent with best practices models.171 Many negotiate for
additional transparency, which frequently depends on their respective bargaining
power drawn from institutional status or ownership share.172 Most perform
extensive due diligence procedures before making investment decisions.173 This
is consistent with the underlying theory supporting the public-private divide
under federal securities law, namely, that elite investors can sufficiently protect
themselves without the need for government intervention.174 But herein lies the
problem. These kinds of investors have no real incentives to hold advisers
accountable for unintended harms to targeted communities for which they do not
belong. If they can exploit these communities for profit without having to absorb
the costs of any resulting negative externalities, then they are highly unlikely to
hold advisers accountable.
One class of elite investors provide a sliver of hope: public pension plans.
David Webber’s book The Rise of the Working-Class Shareholder: Labor’s Last
Best Weapon, documents in detail the extent to which such pension plans have
successfully advocated on behalf of their underlying retail investor
beneficiaries.175 Pension plan trustees have frequently utilized their power as
shareholder activists to preserve and create jobs and to impede purely selfinterested board decisions.176 Unfortunately, despite the notable power of
prominent pension plans such as CalPERS, public pension plans are a dying
breed.177 The bulk of average investors save for retirement through a defined
contribution plan such as a 401(k) or 403(b), where they are primarily selecting
from a range of mutual fund investments.178 Defined contribution plans are not

171. See Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation
and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 287–88 (2009) (noting that hedge fund investors
frequently demand and receive additional disclosures from hedge fund advisers).
172. See Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory
Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 992 (2006) (contending that hedge fund
investors, “particularly institutional investors, engage in active due diligence before investing, routinely
retain advisory firms to evaluate options for them, and negotiate for more disclosure from hedge
funds . . . .”).
173. See id.
174. See id. at 994–95.
175. DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST
WEAPON (2018).
176. See id. at 211.
177. Id. at 214–15.
178. See id. at 218.
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centrally managed by advisers who can wield their significant power to thwart
corporate malfeasance.179 Individual investors of these plans likely rely on the
advisers of their mutual fund holdings to vote on their behalf. As previously
mentioned, mutual fund advisers are far less likely to perform a shareholder
activist role and tend to vote alongside management—particularly when
considering their potential business conflicts.180 For these reasons, this Article
proposes a novel exemption that extends beyond shareholder activism to include
additional mechanisms for disclosure, access, and accountability.
To the extent that social impact investing does generate negative
externalities, there is no mechanism in place for underlying advisers to face any
level of accountability for their decisions gone awry. Information received by
elite investors is not distributed to the general public or made available through
an accessible medium such as a website or database. Even if it were publicly
available, it is not standardized, so it would be difficult to make meaningful
comparisons across a range of investments.181 As a result, there is no formal or
informal mechanism for processing community complaints, and the opacity of
these markets prevents even public embarrassment from serving that role. This
is contrary to other comparable categories of investments such as development
finance institutions.182 As noted by prominent experts Natalie Bridgeman Fields
and Gayle Peterson,
Development finance institutions, which until recently were the only
investors operating in the development space, have accountability offices
in place to respond when things go wrong, after 50 years of experience in
the space. For example, the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman is the
grievance body for the International Finance Corp., the World Bank’s
private sector arm. It receives, evaluates, and also mediates complaints
about social and environmental harm caused by IFC-backed projects.
Elsewhere, the United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation has
an accountability mechanism to address claims from community members.
Every multilateral development bank now has access to an accountability
office. However, no such bodies exist in the impact investing space.183

179. See id.
180. See id. at 220. See generally How Sustainable ETFs Let Small Investors Make a Difference,
supra note 80.
181. See generally Cary Martin, Is Systemic Risk Prevention the New Paradigm? A Proposal to
Expand Investor Protection Principles to the Hedge Fund Industry, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 87 (2012)
(unveiling the difficulties associated with optimizing a range of investment decisions when provided
disclosures lack standardization).
182. See, e.g., Shalanda H. Baker, Why the IFC’s Free, Prior, and Informed Consent Policy Does
Not Matter (Yet) to Indigenous Communities Affected by Development Projects, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 668,
669–71 (2012) (summarizing and critiquing the IFC’s informed consent policy).
183. Sophie Edwards, Impact Investors Must Set Up ‘Accountability Tools,’ Experts Say, DEVEX
(Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.devex.com/news/impact-investors-must-set-up-accountability-toolsexperts-say-92528 [perma.cc/S8MU-ELQ9].
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It is not entirely clear whether regulators will heed these concerns and pull
impact investors under a comparable accountability model. Doing so would
alleviate some of the issues resulting from elite investors’ privileged access to
social impact investments. However, retooling exemptions under federal
securities laws to better reflect the updated notions of publicness within social
impact investing could help to prevent these harms from occurring in the first
place, thereby reducing the need for accountability.
D. Limitations of Private Ordering
Many commentators support private ordering as a solution to the problems
outlined in this Section, but privately ordered solutions are inherently limited.
First, because compliance is voluntary, noncompliant entities may continue to
generate significant externalities with no enforceable recourse for the intended
beneficiaries. Second, the lack of standardization in measurement and disclosure
of impact makes it virtually impossible for stakeholders to evaluate the net social
benefits of privately ordered solutions. Finally, the elite private investors who
currently dominate social impact investing may not have sufficient incentive to
implement reforms that cut into the profitability of the industry. Yet, privately
ordered solutions remain popular.
There are several reasons that researchers and commentators support the
further development of social impact investing with limited government
intervention despite the noted drawbacks. First, privately ordered solutions are
sometimes considered superior to government-imposed regulations which can be
unnecessarily cumbersome and costly.184 Government entities have an infamous
history of failing to incorporate private sector perspectives, which can lead to
regulations that are not closely tailored to the underlying problems that they are
184. See, e.g., Knowledge@Wharton, Taking Stock of Dodd-Frank: Hits, Misses and Unfinished
Business,
WHARTON
SCH.
UNIV.
OF
PA.,
at
03:07
(July
22,
2015),
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/taking-stock-of-dodd-frank-hits-misses-and-unfinishedbusiness/ [https://perma.cc/7Y6C-SX9V] (capturing Todd Zywicki asserting that “[U.S. Congress]
rushed into Dodd-Frank without having any idea of what they were doing; they never properly
diagnosed the underlying causes of the crisis”); see also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WALL STREET 52 (3d ed. 2003) (remarking that “[President] Roosevelt was determined to draft and
quickly submit to Congress a securities bill that could be voted on while he still enjoyed the extraordinary
political support generated by the bank crisis”); William Dunkelberg, The Insidious Cost of Regulation,
FORBES (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamdunkelberg/2017/04/04/the-insidiouscost-of-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/8GTE-RHQY] (observing that “[t]he Competitive Enterprise
Institute noted that in 2015 the government issued over 80,000 pages of rules including 76 ‘major’ rules
costing more than $100 million to implement”). But see PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, GOVERNMENT
REGULATION: COSTS LOWER, BENEFITS GREATER THAN INDUSTRY ESTIMATES 1 (2015),
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2015/05/industry/government_regulation_costs_lower_benefits_greater_than_industry_
estimates.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FQ6-7YHG] (“Although an argument is sometimes made that the cost
of complying with regulations is too high, that the societal benefits do not justify the investment, or that
job losses will result, a review of past regulations reveals just the opposite. Historically, compliance
costs have been less and benefits greater than industry predictions, and regulation typically poses little
challenge to economic competitiveness.”).
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intended to resolve.185 Second, regulatory responses involving federal securities
laws are often hurried and ill-conceived as they are frequently developed in
response to a financial crisis or massive fraud.186 It can be difficult for regulators
to generate the political capital needed to advocate for regulatory proposals that
are contrary to prevailing political powers. Third, imposing stringent regulatory
requirements could deter advisers from pursuing these strategies altogether. This
concern may be justifiable, as the government and philanthropists are unlikely
to have the resources to sufficiently fill funding gaps related to eradicating
poverty, reducing inequality, and reversing climate change.
The support for privately ordered solutions is not simply academic, as
several privately enforced models have emerged in recent years. In the spring of
2019, the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”) launched a set of principles
aimed to “support the development of the impact investing industry by
establishing a common discipline around the management of investments for
impact.”187 The Georgetown Beeck Center on Social Impact and Investing has
“launched a national effort . . . to incorporate impact objectives into investment
strategies for low-income communities . . . [and are using] the conversation
swell around Opportunity Zones to convene a diverse group of
stakeholders . . . and test new models of community investment.”188 Howard W.
Buffett, Warren Buffet’s grandson, has recently unveiled an innovative software
tool that provides novel measures of various categories of impact for OZ
investments, including social, environmental, and economic impacts.189 B-Lab,
a nonprofit organization, developed a pioneering framework to ensure that
companies that are labeled as B corporations are, in fact, doing well while doing
good for society.190 Under this framework, enterprises that are organized as
Certified Benefit Corporations are required to comply with arduous public
transparency mandates and independently verified impact measures.191
But solely relying on private ordering is likely to leave costly loopholes due
to the inherent limitations of these models. First and foremost, compliance with
these frameworks is completely voluntary, leaving vast gaps in terms of the

185. See Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 184.
186. See id.
187. Impact
Investing
at
IFC,
INT’L
FIN.
CORP.,
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/development+i
mpact/principles [https://perma.cc/HB93-2SQL]; see also INVESTING FOR IMPACT, supra note 38, at 3–
6 (enumerating principles for impact investing).
188. Inclusive Community Impact Investing, BEECK CTR. GEO. UNIV. (Feb. 2018),
https://beeckcenter.georgetown.edu/project/inclusive-impact-investing-opportunity-zones/
[perma.cc/MS6N-2434].
189. See Keith Larsen, Warren Buffett’s Grandson and the Art of Opportunity Zone Social Impact
Investing, REAL DEAL (Feb. 7, 2020), https://therealdeal.com/2020/02/07/warren-buffetts-grandsonand-the-zen-of-opportunity-zone-social-impact-investing/ [https://perma.cc/E7KW-UW4W].
190. See About B Corps, B LAB, https://bcorporation.net/about-b-corps [https://perma.cc/KZ8875ZB ].
191. See id.
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negative externalities that could be generated by noncompliant entities. Given
the multitude of models proliferated by a wide range of private actors, there is a
complete lack of standardization regarding how impact is measured and
disclosed arising from these models. This lack of standardization is particularly
problematic as it makes it virtually impossible for affected stakeholders to assess
the extent to which social impact investors are truly maximizing net social
welfare. Attempting to compare a range of privately held entities following
divergent frameworks for measuring and disclosing impact would likely be a
fruitless endeavor.
Furthermore, elite investors will likely support models that help to preserve
their self-interest as opposed to models that prioritize the interests of targeted
community members. There is already evidence implying that elite investors
prefer to preserve their self-interest. The Accountability Counsel, which
“advocates for people harmed by internationally financed projects,”192
highlighted several limitations regarding the model proposed by the IFC—a
model that gathered over 120 global investor signatories.193 According to the
Accountability Counsel, “the Principles [adopted by the IFC] should go further
in their reference and incorporation of transparency, accountability, consultation,
and harm avoidance and remediation.”194 The Accountability Counsel further
notes that “guidance for managing negative impacts . . . should be equally or
more robust than for positive impacts. This includes proactively consulting
affected local communities at every stage of investment and providing them with
a mechanism to provide feedback about positive and negative impacts.”195 The
IFC principles are shockingly devoid of any concrete recommendations for
impact investors to consult with or provide meaningful accountability
mechanisms for community members who are the targeted beneficiaries of social
impact investments.196 This is quite troubling given the minimal involvement of
192. About Us, ACCOUNTABILITY COUNS., https://www.accountabilitycounsel.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/6SKH-P8Q3].
193. See Signatories & Reporting, OPERATING PRINCIPLES IMPACT MGMT.,
https://www.impactprinciples.org/signatories-reporting [https://perma.cc/2NCB-H7M4]; INVESTING
FOR IMPACT, supra note 38 (enumerating principles for impact investing based on the IFC model); Letter
from Accountability Couns., Action Paysanne Contre la Faim, Afr. Ctr. for Corp. Resp., Afr. L. Found.
(AFRILAW), Arbeitsgemeinschaft Regenwald und Artenschutz (ARA), Bank Info. Ctr., BankTrack,
Ctr. for In’l Env’t L. (CIEL), Conseil Régional des Organisations Non Gouvernementales de
Développement, Due Process of L. Found., Fund Our Future, Gender Action, Glob. Network for Good
Governance (GNGG), Inclusive Deve. Int’l, Int’l Accountability Project (IAP), Int’l Rivers, Afr.
Program, MiningWatch Can., Observatoire d’Etudes et d’Appui à la Responsabilité Sociale et
Environnementale (OEARSE), Oxfam Int’l, Oyu Tolgoi Watch, Responsible Sourcing Network, Rts.
CoLab, Rivers without Boundaries, Soc. Just. Connection, & Urgewald, to Hans Peter Lankes, Vice
President, Econ. Priv. Sector Dev., Int’l Fin. Corp. (Dec. 21, 2018) [hereinafter Accountability Counsel
Recommendations],
https://www.accountabilitycounsel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/12-21-18submission-on-ifc-operating-principles-for-impact-management.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G3C-GUBB]
(noting limitations of the IFC model and recommending revisions).
194. Accountability Counsel Recommendations, supra note 193, at 1.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 2–5.
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such community members as investors, managers, or consultants within these
schemes.
Leaving these harms unregulated can deepen the problems that these
investments are purportedly trying to solve. The negative externalities frequently
generated by these privately held entities can increase the costs associated with
poverty, climate change, and inequality. Arguably, the public-private divide
under the federal securities laws is itself perpetuating wealth inequality. Federal
securities laws are deeply embedded with antiquated notions of publicness that
can serve as a gateway for wealthy investors to profit from the pain of the poor
and disadvantaged. This serves to leave behind trails of additional pain and
destruction with little to no accountability. These lingering loopholes could also
disincentivize the creation of government-funded programs or philanthropic
efforts due to the potential overreliance on these flawed private sector solutions.
Evidence shows that simply donating money to charity yields higher degrees of
impact than allocating to social impact investments.197 While scrutinizing this
evidence is largely beyond the scope of this Article, the next Section will discuss
how additional transparency and accountability mechanisms in the social impact
investing space can help to better answer this question.
III.
RECONCEPTUALIZING THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE THROUGH NEW SOCIAL
IMPACT EXEMPTIONS
For these loopholes to be resolved, the public-private divide under federal
securities laws must be reconceptualized. The inconsistent treatment of
publicness under the Securities and Exchange Acts, or the incoherent responses
of lawmakers to increasing notions of publicness due to the events contributing
to the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 present similar problems.198 However,
this Article is the first to explore the reconceptualization of publicness in the
context of social impact investing. By and large, Congress must reconsider
antiquated indicators of publicness across various facets of the federal securities
laws to better reflect the innovations generated by regulated industries.
Lawmakers must similarly update mandated protections under federal securities
laws to better protect the general public against the spillover effects of private
entities. This Section offers a novel regulatory solution and proposes that
lawmakers create new tailored exemptions for social impact investments.
Revising federal securities law would resolve some of the limitations of
existing frameworks. It would obligate social impact investors to comply with a
standardized disclosure framework, making benefit corporation compliance
mandatory rather than voluntary. This proposal would likewise increase
community participation to mitigate negative externalities ex ante. It would also

197.
198.

See, e.g., HILLEBRANDT & HALSTEAD, supra note 20, at 5, 54–56.
See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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engage targeted community members who would no longer have to rely on the
few remaining activist pension plan shareholders to exercise their diminishing
power. They would instead be able to directly access these investments to
varying degrees as investors or managers. Together these effects would help
ensure that social impact investments do not merely profit from the pain of their
targeted beneficiaries but create positive social impacts in the communities they
are intended to serve.
A. Social Impact Exemptions
Any solution that seeks to reconceptualize publicness will inevitably
require the creation of new regulatory frameworks that combine existing
indicators of public and private and create new measures of each.
Reconceptualizing publicness in a truly comprehensive manner would entail
rigorous analysis in the fields of economics, law, finance, behavioral
psychology, and more. The preexisting divisions between public and private
have been effectively eroded through financial innovation and widening
regulatory loopholes. Categorizing funds as private simply because they are
restricted to elite investors who can fend for themselves no longer works in a
world where their investments can generate massive negative externalities.
One solution is to create an entirely new series of exemptions that
recalibrate rules related to access and disclosure, while creating new mechanisms
for accountability and management structure. There are four components to the
proposed exemptions: (1) disclosure, (2) access, (3) accountability, and (4)
management. The collective impact of these components would further engage
the government and affected community members in eradicating social harms,
instead of solely relying on benevolent private investors. Not each of these
components is equally feasible. Disclosure would probably be the most feasible
component to effectuate since it falls within the historical purview of the SEC’s
regulatory powers. As such, new social impact exemptions should at minimum
include tailored disclosure requirements to increase protections for targeted
community members.
The other components present more practical difficulties. The access and
accountability components would require significantly more analysis and
scrutiny from a wide variety of experts. Further, the SEC has not traditionally
utilized accountability to enforce its broader investor protection mandate outside
of its mandatory disclosure framework, so adding an accountability component
to new social impact exemptions may require an expansion of SEC powers that
could be politically difficult. Finally, the management component of this
proposal would be exceedingly difficult, both politically and practically, to
obligate entities to include affected community members within their
management structure.
This proposal urges lawmakers to consider each of these components as
innovative mechanisms to prevent the negative externalities discussed herein.
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The SEC is mandated to protect investors. Adequately ensuring such investor
protection in light of a rapidly changing marketplace likely requires tools that
extend beyond disclosure and access. Moreover, the definition of investor has
arguably been expanded to include underlying beneficiaries of institutional
investors, such as pension plans and endowments, which qualify as elite
investors. And potential harms generated by Private Funds warrant further
analysis of inventive mechanisms to regulate the blurred distinction between
private and public entities. The final sections of this Article will discuss the pros
and cons of further regulation of access, disclosure, and management in investing
entities to address negative externalities.
This Article proposes new Social Impact Exemptions that would appear
under the Securities Act and the 1940 Act and be subject to SEC oversight. Funds
and companies that effectuate social impact investing strategies would be
obligated to comply with these exemptions in exchange for regulatory
flexibilities. These flexibilities could include greater freedom to invest in illiquid
instruments and a clear expansion of fiduciary duties, which is necessary to
access social impact investments yielding lower returns. Compliance with the
Social Impact Exemptions would also permit investment funds and other
corporate entities to avoid any remaining registration requirements that may
appear under the Securities Act and the 1940 Act.
The SEC’s Division on Economic Risk and Analysis should compile a team
of experts to create the tailored rules within these new exemptions and the
triggers for their application.199 Before crafting the rules within the exemptions,
this team would face the arduous challenge of adopting appropriate thresholds to
trigger compliance with the new exemptions. Bright-line thresholds can be
inherently overinclusive or underinclusive, whereas principles-based standards
can require excessive resources to effectively implement. A bright-line threshold
would automatically trigger compliance; for example, the threshold could state
that the exemption automatically applies to any funds and companies seeking to
utilize special tax treatment resulting from investment in opportunity zones, or
any entities that are organized as benefit corporations. Similarly, the SEC could
require compliance from any entities that have adopted a social impact investing
strategy, although social impact would have to be more clearly defined. Once
these compliance triggers are determined, the team should then consider the
regulatory nuances of the disclosure, access, accountability, and management
components discussed above. Ultimately, regulatory focus on these components
will be of paramount importance in moving beyond a federal securities landscape

199. See About the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan.
13, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/dera/about [https://perma.cc/2KBV-NDJK] (describing how this
relatively new “think tank” division “engages across the entire range of the agency’s functions, including
rulemaking, examination, and enforcement [and] [i]ts multi-disciplinary analyses are informed by
research insights, and they rely on the knowledge of institutions and practices when examining
regulatory and risk-related matters”).
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that allows elite investors to profit from the pain of the same marginalized
communities they proffer to support.
1. Disclosure
Disclosure obligations are typically triggered under federal securities laws
when securities are offered for sale to the general public.200 This obligation is
consistent with the investor protection principles embedded in these laws. Retail
investors are generally entitled to receive any material information regarding an
issuer’s offering, its overall business and management structure, its audited
financial statements, and other relevant information.201 Importantly, private
entities’ generation of negative externalities typically do not trigger disclosure
obligations, a key issue this section seeks to address.
Many researchers do not agree that privately held entities create high levels
of negative externalities. Even if researchers do think that privately held entities
create negative externalities, many do not agree that the SEC is the appropriate
regulatory body to resolve or mitigate these harms.202 For instance, many
researchers and commentators think that banking regulators are better equipped
to protect the general public from the negative externalities potentially generated
by Private Funds.203
This perspective must change, and investor status as a retail investor must
not remain a primary indicator of publicness in triggering disclosure
requirements, particularly in the social impact investing context. There is no
single regulatory body that could appropriately mitigate the harms generated by
social impact investing’s negative externalities. This is because these
externalities can result from several classes of products and services, which are
created by various categories of legal entities, and which can harm communities
on a global scale. Even if there was a single regulatory body that could optimally
resolve these issues, affected community members should be entitled to material
disclosures regarding any projects that may adversely affect their surrounding
communities. As such, the SEC should mandate entities relying on the Social
Impact Exemptions to disclose the full extent to which they are maximizing net
social welfare. They should also be required to disclose any and all due diligence
procedures that they have undergone with respect to the engagement with

200. For the sake of clarity, some private placement exemptions do permit retail investors, but
only to a limited extent. For example, Rule 506 under Regulation D allows for up to 35 retail investors
as long as they are sufficiently sophisticated as defined under SEC rules. See Regulation D, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506(b)(2)(i) & (ii) (2020).
201. See Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77j–77k (2018); LEMKE ET AL., supra note 95, § 5.02
(summarizing the extensive disclosure requirements that apply to registered investment companies).
202. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury
Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 776 (2009) (arguing in favor of the reallocation of some
regulatory power from the SEC to other banking regulators for all financial institutions that could
destabilize the financial system).
203. See, e.g., id.
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targeted communities (or lack thereof) and anticipated effects on surrounding
communities.
The general public, affected community members, and even regulators and
policymakers could then scrutinize any anticipated negative externalities of a
social impact investment. The mere act of disclosing this information may
disincentivize bad behavior. More specifically, social impact investors would
likely face increased pressure to reduce or mitigate these harms before they occur
to avoid public embarrassment. A mandatory disclosure framework could
similarly prevent advisers from partaking in impact washing, which conceals the
extent to which advisers are generating a measurable impact. Down the line, the
SEC should also impose standardized measures of impact, some of which are
currently being developed in the private sphere,204 and evaluate the benefits of
mandating ongoing and periodic disclosure obligations for entities relying on
these exemptions.
Many researchers may argue that the increased costs of enhanced
disclosures could deter advisers and other promoters from investing in socially
conscious enterprises. These costs ultimately get passed down to underlying
investors, making this regulatory solution even less desirable to a range of
interests. Even still, advisers may benefit from a standardized disclosure
framework as a tool to enhance their competitive advantage, which may be
desirable in an industry that is growing increasingly saturated. Some advisers
have even advocated for greater transparency, as a recent study administered by
the GIIN found that “[m]ost [investment adviser] respondents highlighted the
importance of greater transparency around impact, with 80% agreeing that
‘greater transparency from impact investors on their impact strategy and results’
would help mitigate the risk of mission drift.”205 Several entities are already
voluntarily providing enhanced disclosures as Certified Benefit Corporations—
in part, this is likely due to the reputational benefits generated from this
designation.206 From the standpoint of investors, a standardized disclosure
framework could prevent negative externalities from occurring ex ante.
Reducing these costs could help to boost investors’ short-term and long-term
gains.
2. Access
Recalibrating access restrictions under federal securities laws is a
complicated endeavor due to the diversity of underlying portfolio companies of
social impact investors. Under standard exemptions, access is divided between
retail and elite investors. Since retail investors are theoretically more vulnerable
to fraudulent schemes, they are mostly restricted to investments comprised of
204. Supra Part II.D.
205. MUDALIAR ET AL., supra note 65, at 16.
206. See Certification Requirements, B LAB, https://bcorporation.net/certification/meet-therequirements [https://perma.cc/7U27-ZQN3].
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publicly traded equities and bonds, and cash instruments.207 This significantly
narrows the universe of strategies available to the investing public.
This proposal does not advocate for a complete removal of the access
restrictions under federal securities laws, since many social impact investments
are excessively risky, but rather, recommends increasing the number of
opportunities available to retail investors in certain categories. Investing in a
novel clean energy technology that is still in its early stages of development
could expose investors to a complete loss of their investment. Moreover, private
equity funds, which are the primary drivers of social impact investments, often
prefer larger investments that are locked into the vehicle for extended periods of
time.208 Retail investors may not have the capacity to lock in their investments
in this manner. And their bargaining power as shareholders may be severely
limited due to their presumably smaller provisions of capital in comparison to
wealthy or institutional investors.
Yet, opening the door to at least some categories of social impact investing
opportunities to retail investors could mitigate many of the harms discussed
herein. As shareholders, affected community members would have a greater
voice in terms of how these vehicles are managed in the form of voting rights
and perhaps other advocacy measures.209 Their interests would be more closely
aligned with the targeted communities than other types of investors. They would
have a heightened understanding of the issues affecting their surrounding
environments, related but not limited to infrastructure development, community
relations, and the interconnectedness of community needs such as food, housing,
education, and climate. Investors attempting to resolve one such need without
sufficiently understanding how that attempt might expand other needs could
cause irreparable damage that ripples across entire ecosystems.210 Elite investors

207.
208.

See supra Part I.C.
See Thomas Kostigen, Impact Investing Is Primed to Become a Bigger Force in 2020,
EQUITIES NEWS (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.equities.com/news/impact-investing-is-primed-to-becomea-bigger-force-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/RH5N-7SG8] (observing that “many impact investments are
private equity securities . . . [and] do not have a readily identifiable exchange of or liquidity mechanism.
Investors can therefore find themselves owning a risky investment with no means to cash out”).
209. See e.g., Alicia E. Plerhoples, Nonprofit Displacement and the Pursuit of Charity Through
Public Benefit Corporations, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 525, 569 (2017) (proposing that “[a]
charitable public benefit corporation could be required to grant or donate a sufficient amount of stock to
a stakeholder or group of stakeholders who would, by virtue of being stockholders, have the right to
bring a derivative lawsuit against the public benefit corporation for failing to pursue its charitable public
benefit”).
210. Gayle Peterson described at least one notable example of a seemingly helpful innovation
destroying surrounding habitats due to limited input from targeted communities:
Take, for example, the initial sale and distribution of insecticide-treated malaria nets to fight
disease in developing countries. Too often, investors failed to work with target communities
before introducing a new product, or they didn’t stick around to gather feedback on how the
nets were used. As a result, many consumers in developing countries used them as fishing nets,
which caused widespread ecological damage.
Peterson, supra note 143.
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may inadvertently identify these “ripples” as “unforeseen” circumstances
irrespective of the resulting harms.
Community member access might be ideal with respect to social impact
investments into designated Opportunity Zones. Having the opportunity to profit
from developments occurring within the very communities in which they reside
could further prevent the wholesale displacement of these targeted community
members. Permitting affected community members to equally benefit from these
external investments could remove the exploitative component of many of these
schemes. These kinds of investments often do not entail the same degree of risk
as other start-up ventures, as promoters are able to purchase real estate at lower
costs while benefitting from the lower tax rates designated to Opportunity Zones.
Under these circumstances, mid-to-low-income community members may
significantly benefit from the longer-term investment horizons inherent in these
schemes to save for retirement, fund college expenses, and pursue other longterm saving goals. Groups of community shareholders could pool their
ownership interests to enhance their bargaining power with respect to negotiating
for additional layers of protections on a personal and community level.
The SEC, under the advisement of its designated team of experts, should
undergo a more detailed analysis on this front to weigh the costs and benefits of
allowing access for certain categories of investments. In particular, they should
focus on social impact investments that are taking advantage of the lower tax
rates for private investment in designated Opportunity Zones. They should
similarly assess whether a financial education requirement should accompany
any removal of access restrictions. As part of its research process, the SEC
should evaluate the extent to which the private sector has successfully created
social impact models that are indeed available for community member
participation. For instance, the Community Investment Trust in Portland, Oregon
created an innovative investment program that is described as follows:
The CIT shares, which can be purchased through monthly investments of
as little as $10 and up to $100 per month, represent a unique real estate
investment for neighborhood investors as they are fully liquid through the
Letter of Credit issued by the primary mortgage holder, Northwest Bank.
As a result, investors are incentivized to invest over the long-term, but they
also have the ability to liquidate their investment at any time without a loss
of their invested amount. To qualify as a neighborhood investor, individuals
must be 18 years-old, live within the designated four zip code area and
complete a financial action course called Moving from Owing to Owning.
The CIT is designed to provide an on-ramp to personal savings by
facilitating investment in a community asset, creating a safety net for those
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in asset poverty and, at the same time, spreading the value of appreciating
property in a gentrifying neighborhood across the larger community.211
Investments of this nature can be an integral first step in removing barriers
to access for targeted community members of social impact investments.212
Lawmakers could further explore how to amend the federal securities laws to
allow for additional opportunities of this scope.
While the Department of Labor (“DOL”) proposed to make private equity
funds more accessible to 401(k) retirement plans in June 2020, this
pronouncement does not achieve the access goals advocated in this Article.213 It
simply opens the door for retail investment in the Private Fund universe without
the nuanced distinctions amongst underlying strategies in light of the increased
risks to the general public. Furthermore, it does not include any additional
transparency requirements that would serve to protect investors, as well as
broader communities, from these rampant harms. Given that institutional
investors (such as pension plans) have historically done a poor job at protecting
underlying beneficiaries from excessive fees charged by Private Fund advisers,
this increased access is troubling at best.214
3. Accountability
Regulated parties under federal securities laws are accountable to
prospective and existing shareholders, as they are mandated to provide material
disclosures related to a range of underlying business activities.215 Shareholders
can bring private causes of action against such regulated parties for material
misrepresentations and omissions.216 Regulated parties are similarly accountable
to the SEC and other regulators as they could potentially face significant fines
for violating the federal securities laws.217 However, there are limited
211. MERCY CORPS, CASE STUDY, THE COMMUNITY INVESTMENT TRUST: A NEW FORM OF
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT CAN HELP LOW-INCOME PEOPLE BUILD ASSETS AND RESILIENCE 11
(2019),
https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/202001/EPCIT%20Case%20Study%20MC%20White%20Paper%202019%20120519.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7PBP-LBNQ].
212. For additional examples of structures that are accessible to targeted community members,
see Dan Wu & Sheila R. Foster, From Smart Cities to Co-Cities: Emerging Legal and Policy Responses
to Urban Vacancy, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 909 (2020).
213. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor Issues Information Letter
on
Private
Equity
Investments
(June
3,
2020),
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20200603-0 [https://perma.cc/2AY9-5L9Q] (“The
Information Letter addresses private equity investments offered as part of a professionally managed
multi-asset class vehicle structured as a target date, target risk, or balanced fund. Adding private equity
investments to such professionally managed investment funds would increase the range of investment
opportunities available to 401(k)-type plan options.”).
214. See Cary Martin Shelby, How Did We Get Here? Dissecting the Hedge Fund Conundrum
Through an Institutional Theory Lens, 74 BUS. LAW. 735, 757–63 (2019).
215. See supra Part II.C.
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accountability measures in place to protect outside stakeholders, such as
surrounding community members and industries, who may be adversely
impacted by the investments of these regulated parties.
The government sometimes imposes a wide range of additional
accountability measures for its public policies, which are broadly defined as
“system[s] of laws, regulatory measures, courses of action, and funding priorities
concerning a given topic promulgated by a governmental entity or its
representatives.”218 While several models for measuring accountability exist,
such measures can include dimensions related to “transparency, liability,
controllability, responsibility, and responsiveness.”219 Government entities may,
for example, provide advance public notice of their projects, seek local
community input, require that their projects first win approval by a community
review board, or require compensation for any negative externalities or
additional harms generated by these projects. For instance, the Bend City
Council in Oregon solicited community input for its law enforcement policies
through “online written public comments from the community, a virtual live
listening session, and feedback from Bend Police Department employees.”220
The SEC could use comparable models to incorporate heightened accountability
mechanisms in the Social Impact Exemptions proposed herein.
While it would be a challenge to define the contours of affected
communities in implementing these measures, the SEC could borrow from
comparable models that have been developed in the project development context.
For example, the IFC now “require[s] that projects financed by the IFC obtain
the free, prior, and informed consent (“FPIC”) of [I]ndigenous peoples affected
by such projects.”221 While many thought that this was a step in the right
direction, Professor Shalanda Baker has argued that this informed consent
requirement is limited by its narrow interpretation of consent.222 She further
argued that, “[u]nder this narrow interpretation, consent lacks teeth and the
ability to affect in any meaningful way the social and environmental risks that
often accompany large projects.”223 The SEC—under the advisement of its team
of experts—should thoroughly evaluate and respond to these (and other)
critiques in exploring existing models of accountability.
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222. See id. at 671.
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4. Management
Ensuring that affected members from targeted communities are somehow
included in managing social impact investments would further help to prevent
negative externalities, as “social entrepreneurs who have direct experience with
the issues they’re tackling often excel in building solutions that are fit-forpurpose.”224 Yet, leadership within the social impact industry faces diversity
gaps that are comparable to many related industries.225 Social entrepreneur Tara
Sabre Collier has thus concluded,
The lack of representation in leadership [of social entrepreneurs] informs
misaligned investment decision making, leading to a world where
philanthropists under-invest in social entrepreneurs of colour, even as those
these [sic] entrepreneurs are more likely to have insights into solving
problems in their communities. It leads to a world where 90% of social
entrepreneurs funded in east Africa have American or European founders.
Equality impact investing would compel impact funders to address these
shortcomings within their own leadership and teams, which could ripple
out in the form of more representative portfolios over time. 226
Alexandra Grüber, a public service management consultant and child
welfare advocate, has similarly asserted, “if we reimagine how we include people
with lived experience in all aspects of child welfare, from policy to technology,
we can build a new system built on equity and justice, child protection and family
preservation.”227 With much of child welfare services being privatized, it is
crucial that the law integrates individuals with lived experiences into the fabric
of underlying decision making processes.
In addition to having interests more closely aligned with social impact
strategies, targeted community members have first-hand knowledge and
exposure to the intricate ways in which their community needs are
interconnected. Understanding the interconnectedness between various needs
like eradicating racial injustices or improving access to food, water, and shelter
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is essential in preventing negative externalities from occurring ex ante. Wellintentioned attempts at resolving one social ill can fail when private actors do
not consider how their solutions could hamper progress towards resolving other
social ills, or even create new ones. These unresolved blind spots could cause
irreparable damage to entire populations of already-vulnerable communities.
Advisers of exempt entities, who may have a limited interest or understanding
of these nuanced issues, might inadvertently identify these blind spots as
“unforeseen” circumstances irrespective of how obvious they may have been to
affected community members. Lived experience provides invaluable layers of
expertise that advisers seem to severely discount in structuring their management
and decision-making processes.
Moreover, scholars have found that increasing diversity can enhance the
effectiveness of complicated systems and structures and serve to improve
investment decision-making.228 The social ills that have afflicted our
communities arise from a complex array of intertwining factors, making them
that much harder to resolve. Racism, sexism, and elitism are often primary
drivers of these complexities. Enhancing diversity can be a cost-effective
mechanism to digest these complexities and produce effective solutions that
actually serve to increase net social welfare. Appointing community members as
leaders in any capacity likewise has a ripple effect, as community members who
rise to leadership roles frequently motivate others to do the same, potentially
adding an additional increase to net social welfare.229 Since affected community
members may encounter financial hurdles in accessing social impact investments
as investors—even if the law changes to enhance accessibility—including them
within the management structure is a crucial alternative to consider.
There are some legislative measures in place that attempt to improve
diversity in management of corporate and governmental entities. From a
regulatory perspective, several states have adopted mandatory diversity
measures for corporate boards where a certain percentage of board members
have to be minorities, women, or a combination of both.230 Section 342 of the
Dodd-Frank Act also “generally obligates a number of federal agencies to create
Offices of Minority and Women Inclusion, [which] are charged with ensuring
the fair inclusion and utilization of minorities and women in all business and
activities of their respective agencies.”231 Section 342 further instructed these
offices to create diversity standards for assessing the policies of its regulated
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entities.232 However, these requirements do not do enough in the context of social
impact investing because board diversity statutes vary by state (many do not have
any), and the diversity assessments imposed by section 342 are voluntary in
nature.233 Private Funds may also be excluded from each of these categories of
mandates. Section 342’s definition of “diversity” likewise does not include
affected community members in the context of enterprises engaged in social
impact investing.
Even still, these frameworks provide useful starting points for integrating a
“diversity” requirement into entities relying on the Social Impact Exemptions. A
provision of this nature would necessarily require that managers of social impact
enterprises be sufficiently diversified with a percentage of community members
that are the targeted beneficiaries of these projects. Hurdles to this proposal
include defining who belongs to a particular community and ensuring that truly
representative voices are included. The limited educational opportunities that are
available to targeted community members may also hinder their participation.
Pervasive inequities, financial constraints, systemic racism, and other roadblocks
could admittedly be prohibitively expensive hurdles to overcome. As such,
researchers should further explore both government and privately funded
educational programs that target such affected communities. Although these
challenges are legitimate, the potential benefits of enhanced diversity in
management necessitate further exploration of this component.
CONCLUSION
Social impact investing has the power to produce astounding results for
communities on an international scale. It can successfully connect distressed
communities to vital resources such as safe drinking water, low-cost business
loans, clean energy sources, and even high-quality educational opportunities.
Government and philanthropist resources will likely be insufficient in resolving
these growing needs in coming decades. However, well-intentioned social
impact investors can create devastating harms that can annihilate the very
communities that they are trying to serve. Many such investments have generated
negative externalities that have decreased net social welfare, thereby creating
even more crises for the already underfunded governments and philanthropists
to try to resolve.
The regulatory framework in which social impact investors operate does
little to address these harms or prevent them from occurring ex ante. Since they
operate mostly as privately held entities, most investors are exempt from the
arduous regulation under the federal securities laws. This exempt status deepens
many of the problems associated with private actors performing functions that
were historically designated to the public sector. Exemptions under federal
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securities laws limit the disclosure that social impact investors provide to the
general public, and they exclude access to affected community members as
investors. Affected community members therefore have no ability to examine
the extent to which such investors are maximizing net social welfare. Even if
such entities were subject to SEC oversight, there would be limited opportunities
for direct accountability to affected communities for investments gone awry, and
there is no mandate that managers of such enterprises be sufficiently diversified
to include a percentage of affected community members. These regulatory
loopholes reveal a deeper problem in that the law has not been sufficiently
updated to account for the increasing publicness of private entities.
Reconceptualizing notions of publicness in the context of social impact
investing would necessarily require merging previous indicators of public and
private, while creating new protections for the increasing publicness of these
private entities. Creating a new series of Social Impact Exemptions, which are
specifically tailored to this industry, can achieve this goal. These exemptions
could include detailed and customized rules related to disclosure, access,
accountability, and management. In exchange for complying with these
exemptions, social impact investors would receive any remaining regulatory
flexibilities under federal securities laws, such as the power to invest in illiquid
instruments. Much research is still required before this proposal can be
successfully implemented to ensure that social impact investors can actually
achieve their stated goals of doing well, while doing good. As new and existing
crises continue to unfold, this will become an even more pressing matter.
Innovations related to the COVID-19 pandemic may seek to do well, but without
the proper regulatory framework, can result in even more harm to affected
communities. In a similar vein, social impact investors may seize opportunities
to create privately developed solutions to resolve the racial injustices unveiled
by the Black Lives Matter movement, to the exclusion and detriment of those
they are proffered to benefit. Scholars across disciplines must continuously
investigate solutions to the myriad of problems created by the blurred
distinctions between public and private entities, which often leaves the most
vulnerable of communities at risk for unintended harms, while commodifying
those harms for elite investors to continuously profit from our pain.

